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P71-IS article covers cases from 85 S. W.3d through 114 S. W.3d, 315
F.3d 533 through 345 F.3d 909, and 241 F. Supp. 2d 715 through
276 F. Supp. 2d 1382, which the authors believed were noteworthy
by adding to the jurisprudence on the applicable subject. The authors ac-
knowledge the assistance of Lorin Combs, Craig Davis, Noelle Garsek,
Ben Herd, Carrah Key, Katie Kildebeck, Barbara LeBarron, Jason Mar-
shall, Rob Pivnick, Bill Weinberg, Wade Williams and Steven Woods for
the initial review and drafting of a portion of this article.
I. MORTGAGES, LIENS AND FORECLOSURES
West Trinity Properties, Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp.,' in-
volved a dispute between two parties who purchased the same property
at two different, competing foreclosure sales. The first lienholder, Chase
Manhattan Mortgage Corporation, foreclosed on December 7, 1999, hav-
ing posted the property for foreclosure during the debtor's pending bank-
ruptcy proceeding. Chase claimed that it never received notice of the
bankruptcy. In March, 2000, the homeowner's association, having ob-
tained a judgment lien for association dues prior to the debtor's bank-
ruptcy filing, foreclosed its lien and the property was sold to West Trinity
Properties at that foreclosure sale. Chase, having subsequently learned
of the debtor's bankruptcy filing, filed a motion with the bankruptcy
court to reinstate the debtor's case for the purpose of granting Chase
relief from the automatic stay. The motion was dismissed, and Chase re-
scinded and cancelled the recorded foreclosure sale. In a separate suit,
the lien priority of West Trinity and Chase was argued, with the court
holding that Chase's first lien was superior to the homeowners associa-
tion's lien; therefore, West Trinity acquired title to the property subject to
the Chase first lien debt. 2
Hawk v. E.K. Arledge, Inc.,3 also involved purchasers of competing
foreclosure sales of the same property. Arledge, the purchaser at a tax
lien sale, sued Hawk, the purchaser at a subsequent trustee's sale, to quiet
title to the land. From February, 1988, until June 3, 1997, the, date of the
tax lien sale, the property in question was subject to deed of trust liens.
The Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) was appointed in 1990 as re-
ceiver of the owner of the various notes and deeds of trust. After various
conveyances, the notes and liens were eventually assigned to Hawk who
foreclosed on the liens in 1999. Various taxing authorities filed suit to
collect delinquent ad valorem taxes, which was eventually tried in 1997
and resulted in a 1997 sheriff's sale of the property to Arledge. 4 Hawk
1. W. Trinity Props., Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 92 S.W.3d 866 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.).
2. Id. at 867-69.
3. Hawk v. E.K. Arledge, Inc., 107 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2003, pet.
denied).
4. Id. at 81-82.
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argued that the tax foreclosure was ineffective against its interest because
of 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2), a part of the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act, which provided that, "[n]o property of
the [RTC] shall be subject to levy, attachment, garnishment, foreclosure,
or sale without the consent of the [RTC], nor shall any involuntary lien
attach to the property of the [RTC]."'5 The court rejected Hawk's argu-
ment, explaining that the RTC was not the owner of the deed of trust
liens at the time of foreclosure of the tax liens, and Hawk could not assert
such RTC defense on its behalf. The time of enforcement, not the time of
attachment, of the liens, was the relevant point of time for determining
application of such statutory prohibition. 6
Walker v. Geer7 involved a conflict between a judgment lien and the
limitations period from adverse possession. In 1995, Walker took a
$296,000 judgment against a debtor and duly filed an abstract of judg-
ment. The debtor subsequently sold the unimproved land in 1996, with
Greer acquiring the property in 1999. In 2000, after a house had been
constructed on the land, Walker filed suit to foreclose the judgment lien
on the property.8 The court ruled that Walker's claim was time-barred by
the three year statute of limitations set forth in Texas Civil Practices
and Remedies Code Annotated Section 16.024, where the purchaser
shows peaceable adverse possession under color of title for three years or
more. The three year clock starts when the creditor knew or, with the
exercise of ordinary care, should have known about the sale of the prop-
erty. The evidence showed that Walker knew of the sale for nearly four
years prior to bringing suit.9 Walker also made claims of civil conspiracy
and fraudulent conveyance. Evidence that the title company and pur-
chaser knew of Walker's judgment lien, was, in itself, insufficient to show
an intent to hinder, delay or defraud, and there was no evidence that any
of the property owners took any action to prevent Walker from foreclos-
ing the lien or otherwise hinder, delay or defraud Walker in protecting
her interests.' 0
In N.P., Inc. v. Turboff," the Texas Supreme Court dealt with a devel-
oper's claim to payment under a contract with the Harris County Munici-
pal Utility District (MUD), after the developer's property had been sold
at foreclosure. In 1984, Turboff entered into a contract with the MUD for
the construction of water and sewer facilities on a 135 acre tract that
Turboff was developing. The contract provided that Turboff would build
the facilities and convey them to the MUD in exchange for payment.
Turboff financed the acquisition and development costs by a loan from
First Texas Savings Association. Before Turboff completed construction
5. Id. at 82.
6. Id. at 83.
7. Walker v. Geer, 99 S.W.3d 244 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2003, no pet.).
8. Id. at 245-46.
9. Id. at 247.
10. Id. at 247-48.
11. N.P., Inc. v. Turboff, 111 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. 2003).
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of the utility facilities, First Texas declared the loan to be in default and
foreclosed on the property. Turboff disputed and the claims were eventu-
ally settled by a written agreement whereby First Texas would keep the
land, but Turboff would retain any payment rights under the 1984 con-
tract with the MUD. In 1995, N.P., Inc. acquired the property. The deed
to N.P., Inc. expressly excluded any payment rights under the MUD con-
tract. N.P., Inc. completed construction of the utility facilities and en-
tered into its own contract with the MUD. In 1998, Turboff sued N.P.,
Inc. seeking a declaratory judgment that Turboff, not N.P., Inc., was enti-
tled to payment from the MUD.12 On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court
explained that the right to payment under the MUD contract was not an
interest running with the land. While an interest in utility facilities may
run with the land, the 1984 MUD contract right was personal and did not
run with the land. Furthermore, because Turboff was not able to com-
plete performance under the MUD Contract due to the foreclosure, it
was not entitled to payment from the MUD. 13
In TMS Mortgage, Inc. v. Golias,'4 a second lienholder sued a first
lienholder for failure to provide notice to the second lienholder of a mo-
tion to lift stay. Golias sold her home to the Grants, who financed the
acquisition by a first loan from TMS and a second lien loan from Golias.
The Grants defaulted under both loans and filed for bankruptcy. TMS
filed a lift stay motion, but failed to notify Golias, because the Grants did
not list Golias as a creditor in their bankruptcy filings. After TMS's fore-
closure, Golias sued TMS, arguing that Local Bankruptcy Rule 9013 of
the Eastern District of Texas requires a party seeking relief from the au-
tomatic stay to notify other parties claiming a security interest in the
same property.15 The court ruled that there is no legal duty of a superior
lienholder to protect the security interest of a junior lienholder, distin-
guishing cases involving bankruptcy trustees whose fiduciary duties are
inherent in the function of a bankruptcy trustee. Although TMS may
have violated the bankruptcy rules, the Court refused to find liability be-
cause of the failure to comply with applicable bankruptcy procedure in
the absence of a contractual or fiduciary relationship or intentional or
malicious conduct. 16
II. NOTES, LOAN COMMITMENTS AND LOAN AGREEMENTS
Parker v. Dodge17 involved the determination of the applicable statute
of limitation for a note. Parker executed a $120,000 promissory note re-
quiring monthly interest payments of $1,000 on the first day of each
month during a stated ten-year period and a balloon payment of $120,000
12. Id. at 41-43.
13. Id. at 43-46.
14. TMS Mortgage, Inc. v. Golias, 102 S.W.3d 768 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2003, no
pet.).
15. Id. at 769-71.
16. Id. at 771-72.
17. Parker v. Dodge, 98 S.W.3d 297 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
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on October 1, 2000, the tenth anniversary. Parker made only one pay-
ment to Dodge in December, 1990. After maturity of the note on June
28, 2001, Dodge filed a petition seeking damages for Parker's failure to
pay, and the court granted Dodge's summary judgment motion. On ap-
peal, Parker argued that the note was a demand note and that the ten-
year statute of limitations had run on the entirety of Dodge's claim pursu-
ant to Texas Business and Commerce Code Section 3.118(b). A demand
note is one payable on demand or at site, at the will of the holder, or one
that does not state any time of payment. 18  Since there was a specific
date for payment of interest and principal, the note was not a demand
note and therefore was instead subject to a six-year statute of limitation
(based on no demand for payment and no payment of either principal or
interest for a continuous period of ten years) pursuant to Sec-
tion 3.118(a). Dodge's claim to payments within the six-year statute of
limitations was upheld, but not Dodge's claim to payments earlier than
the six-year statute of limitations. 19 Parker also raised the affirmative de-
fense of laches since Dodge had not demanded payment for the entire
ten-year term of the note. A laches claim requires a showing of an unrea-
sonable delay in asserting a legal or equitable right and a good faith
change in position to the detriment of the claimant in reliance upon the
delay. The failure of Dodge to make demand on a note with periodic
payments was not an unreasonable delay. Furthermore, Parker's claim
that he changed his financial position due to "getting older, combined
with a lesser ability to work" was not a good faith change of position due
to any reliance upon a delay by Dodge.20
In Kent v. Citizens State Bank,21 in order to avoid foreclosure action on
two defaulted notes held by Citizens State Bank, the Kents executed a
renewal, extension and consolidation note that included a provision disal-
lowing the assignment of the Kents' rights, duties and obligations. A
deed in lieu of foreclosure was also executed by the Kents in favor of the
bank. The loan agreement allowed for the filing of the deed by Citizens
State Bank in the event that the Kents defaulted on the consolidation
note, provided that the bank would attempt to market the property for
twelve months and apply the proceeds of any sale to the consolidation
note and pay to the Kents any surplus received. The Kents subsequently
defaulted under the note and the deed was filed by the bank. Shortly
after filing the deed in lieu of foreclosure, Citizens State Bank conveyed
the property to another lender, subject to all agreements between the
Kents and Citizens State Bank. Prior to the end of the twelve-month
marketing period, the Kents negotiated the sale of the collateral realty to
a third party who presented a check for the balance owed under the note
to Citizens State Bank. Not being the current holder of the note, Citizens
18. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.108(a).
19. Parker, 98 S.W.3d at 300-01.
20. Id. at 301.




State Bank refused to accept the check. The Kents argued that obliga-
tions under the loan agreement were not transferable by Citizens State
Bank and that it should have accepted payment. 22 The court found that
the non-assignability clause applied to the Kents and did not limit Citizen
State's Bank rights of assignment and therefore, the assignment by Citi-
zens State Bank was valid.23
Construction of a home equity constitutional provisions was presented
in Vincent v. Bank of America.24 The loan agreement evidencing the loan
required that the payments were to be applied as if received on the first
day of the month, regardless of when actually received. The payment was
to be applied first to interest accrued on the assumed date of payment,
second to scheduled principal reduction, third to any late charges, and the
balance of the payment was to be applied to principal not yet paid. The
payments were not applied by Bank of America as required by the loan
agreement resulting in the accrual of interest in excess of the monthly
interest amount for several months. The Vincents claimed that the
breach by Bank of America violated Texas Constitution article XVI, Sec-
tion 50(a)(6)(L) 25 and that the interest and principal due under the note
should be forfeited. The court determined that the Texas Constitution
dictates forfeiture of principal and interest only if the loan, as docu-
mented, violates a constitutional prohibition, and not upon a breach of a
properly documented constitutionally mandated provision.2 6
In Montgomery First Corp. v. Caprock Investment Corp.,27 a note-
holder's summary judgment motion in a collection action was denied due
to the holder's failure to establish the applicable interest rate, and there-
fore, the amount due on the note. Montgomery First Corp. (Montgom-
ery) executed a note payable to Texas Bank & Trust Co. (TB&T). The
note featured a variable interest rate of. one percent over the TB&T base
rate. TB&T failed and its assets were transferred to the FDIC; subse-
quently, Caprock Investment Corp. (Caprock) became the holder of the
note. After Montgomery defaulted on the note, Caprock filed suit to col-
lect. The trial court granted Caprock's summary judgment motion, and
Montgomery appealed.28 On appeal, the court noted that a summary
judgment movant on a note collection matter must establish, among other
things, that a certain balance is due and owing on the note. In order to
establish this element, Caprock offered an affidavit explaining that the
balance due was $395,394.60, with principal of $154,349.60 and interest of
22. Id. at 872-74.
23. Id. at 873-74.
24. Vincent v. Bank of Am., 109 S.W.3d 856 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied).
25. This constitutional section provides that a home equity loan should be scheduled
to be repaid in equal successive monthly installments beginning no later than two months
from the date the extension of credit is made, and each of such monthly payments must
equal or exceed the amount of accrued interest as of the date of the scheduled installment.
26. Vincent, 109 S.W.3d at 863-63.
27. Montgomery First Corp. v. Caprock Inv. Corp., 89 S.W.3d 179 (Tex. App.-East-
land 2002, no pet.).
28. Id. at 181-82.
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$241,045.44. Attached to the affidavit was a chart that listed various in-
terest rates including a "TB&T Rate." The affidavit did not refer to the
chart, nor did it contain any other explanation of the interest rate used to
calculate the claimed balance due. The court presumed that the TB&T
Rate may have been used in the calculation, but noted that after TB&T
failed, the TB&T Rate no longer existed. The court explained that when
"a variable interest rate in a note is tied to a failed bank's prime or base
rate, 'the trier of fact should apply a reasonable rate of interest, consider-
ing the facts of each case." 29 Because reasonableness is generally a fact
question and there was no summary judgment evidence on this issue, the
court reversed the lower court's judgment and remanded for further
proceedings. 30
Diversified Financial Systems, Inc. v. Hill, Heard, O'Neal, Gilstrap &
Goetz, P.C.,31 involves the ownership of a note. Hill, Heard, O'Neal, Gil-
strap & Goetz, P.C. (Hill) executed a $50,000.00 revolving promissory
note in favor of Commonwealth Bank. The bank failed and the FDIC
acquired the note. Diversified Financial Systems, Inc. (DFS) later pur-
chased the note from the FDIC, and when Hill failed to pay the note,
DFS filed suit. Hill challenged DFS's suit on the basis that, because there
was no written assignment of the note from Commonwealth Bank to the
FDIC, there was a break in the chain of title, and therefore, DFS was not
the holder of the note. 32 The court first noted that, because the note
expressly provided for multiple advances on a revolving basis, the note
was not for a fixed sum of money and was not a negotiable instrument
according to Section 3.104(a) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code.
The court then looked to 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A), which provides that
"[tihe [FDIC] shall, as conservator or receiver, and by operation of law,
succeed to - (i) all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the insured de-
pository institution over which it is appointed. '33 The court then con-
cluded that, due to the federal law, an assignment is not required to
transfer ownership of a note, even a non-negotiable note, from a financial
institution to the FDIC when the financial institution is placed in
receivership. 34
Hill also challenged DFS on the basis that the four-year statute of limi-
tations provided by Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section
16.004(a)(3) expired prior to the initiation of the suit, barring DFS's
claim. The court ruled in favor of DFS, noting that pursuant to 12 USC
§ 1821(d)(14)(A), "the applicable statute of limitations with regard to any
action brought by the [FDIC] as conservator or receiver shall be ... the
29. Id. at 186.
30. Id. at 187.
31. Diversified Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Hill, Heard, O'Neal, Gilstrap & Goetz, P.C., 99 S.W.3d
349 (Tex. App.-Forth Worth 2003, no pet.).
32. Id. at 352-54.
33. Id. at 357.
34. Id. at 358.
2004] Real Property 1163
SMU LAW REVIEW
[six]-year period beginning on the date the claim accrues. '35 The court
further noted that this benefit extends to the purchasers of assets from
the FDIC.36
The case of Shepard v. Boone37 dealt with a homeowner's suit to set
aside a wrongful foreclosure on the grounds that the creditor was not the
owner and holder of the note. In 1986, Boone signed a contract for im-
provements to his home, evidenced by a $45,011.00 promissory note and
secured by a deed of trust covering his home. The original holder of the
note and deed of trust executed an assignment to Shepard that conveyed
all of the holder's interest in the "Contract for Improvements" and the
"Deed of Trust" but did not assign the note. Shortly after the assignment,
Shepard sent Boone a letter explaining that he had purchased the note
and deed of trust. After a default and foreclosure, Boone filed suit to set
aside the sale on the grounds that Shepard was not the owner and holder
of the note at the time of the foreclosure sale. The trial court ruled in
favor of the homeowner and Shepard appealed.38 On appeal, the court
stressed that Texas Business and Commerce Code Section 3.201 provides
that the transfer or "negotiation" of a note requires "transfer of posses-
sion of the instrument and its endorsement by the holder." 39 In this in-
stance, there was no written endorsement or written assignment of the
note. In certain circumstances a note can be transferred without a written
assignment or proper endorsement, so long as there is proof of the trans-
action through which the note was acquired. In the present case, Shepard
did not present any proof of the transfer other than the written assign-
ment which neglected to mention the note, which was insufficient; hence,
the foreclosure was wrongful.40
III. GUARANTIES
In Material Partnerships, Inc. v. Ventura,41 the court discussed whether
a particular guaranty constituted a personal guaranty of an officer of a
company and the elements necessary to create a binding guaranty. Lo-
pez, the general manager of Sacos Tubulares, executed a guaranty which
stated "I, personally, guaranty all outstandings [sic] and liabilities of
Sacos Tubulares with Material Partnership as well as future shipments. '42
When Sacos failed to pay, the vender brought suit against Sacos and Lo-
pez, personally, seeking to enforce the guaranty. Lopez asserted that the
guaranty was ambiguous as to whether Lopez was personally bound
35. Id. at 359.
36. Id.
37. Shepard v. Boone, 99 S.W.3d 263 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2003, no pet.).
38. Id. at 264-65.
39. Id. at 265.
40. Id. at 266-67.
41. Material P'ships v. Ventura, 102 S.W.3d 252 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2003, pet. denied).
42. Id. at 256.
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under its terms.43 The Court determined that the language "I... person-
ally, guaranty" was unambiguous and evidenced a clear intent to create
personal liability on Lopez. The Court also evaluated whether the docu-
ment executed by Lopez contained the requisite elements necessary to
create a binding guaranty. The Texas Statute of Frauds provides that a
promise or agreement is not enforceable unless it is in writing and is
signed by the person charged with such promise.44 Case law requires that
a guaranty must identify the parties involved, an intent to guaranty an
obligation, a description of the obligation and must be supported by con-
sideration. The Court easily determined that these elements were met:
the language "I personally, guaranty" was sufficient to evidence an intent
to guaranty an obligation, the parties were clearly identified, the obliga-
tion was adequately identified as "all outstandings [sic] and liabilities of
Sacos Tubulares with Material Partnerships as well as future shipments,"
and consideration was evidenced by the vendor resuming shipments after
Lopez executed the guaranty. As such, the guaranty was valid and en-
forceable against Lopez personally. 45
IV. USURY
In Garcia v. Texas Cable Partners, L.P.,46 Garcia, a cable-television
subscriber, brought an attempted class-action suit against his cable pro-
vider claiming that a five dollar ($5) late fee constituted usurious interest.
The trial court granted the cable company's motion for summary judg-
ment on the ground that the late fee was not usurious as a matter of
law. 47 On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's decision. As the
source of Texas's usury statutes, the court examined the Texas Constitu-
tion, which grants the legislature the "authority to classify loans and lend-
ers, license and regulate lenders, define interest and fix maximum rates of
interest. '48 The court stated that for usury laws to apply, there must be
an overcharge by a lender for the use, forbearance or detention of
money. The court examined several cases involving claims of usury in the
context of rental agreements, each holding that late fees charged in such
agreements were not interest. Although not involving a rental agree-
ment, the Court also looked to the case of First Bank v. Tony's Tortilla
Factory, Inc.,49 in which the Texas Supreme Court concluded that where a
bank charged an NSF fee for handling bad checks, and such fee was
charged to all customers in the same amount and had no relationship to
the amount of funds advanced, the NSF fee was consideration for the
processing of the bad checks, rather than for the funds advanced. First
43. Id. at 255-57.
44. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(a)(b) (Vernon 2002).
45. Ventura, 102 S.W.3d at 261-62.
46. Garcia v. Tex. Cable Partners, L.P., 114 S.W.3d 561 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2003, no pet.).
47. Id. at 563.
48. Id. at 564 (quoting TEX. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 11).
49. First Bank v. Tony's Tortilla Factory, Inc., 877 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. 1994).
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Bank held that the NSF fee was not interest on the amount advanced to
cover the bad checks.50
Because a notice was sent to subscribers that it was not providing credit
and that the late fee was charged to all customers regardless of the
amount owed, the Court found that the late fee was consideration for the
additional cost of processing the late payments. Since the late fee was
consideration for services other than a lending transaction, the late fee
was not for the use, forbearance or detention of the cable provider's
money, and therefore, was not interest and could not support a claim for
usury.5 1
In re CPDC, Inc.,52 addressed the issue of what constitutes "actual dis-
covery" under what is now Section 305.103 of the Texas Finance Code.5 3
In August 1994, CPDC, Inc., as borrower, in connection with the acquisi-
tion of unimproved real property and stock in a related utility company,
gave the seller a $1,095,000 note secured by a deed of lien on the realty
and a $200,000 note secured by a security interest in the stock of the util-
ity company. Additionally, CPDC entered into a security services con-
sulting agreement with Ideal Systems, an affiliate of Zer-Ilan. A few
weeks after the documents were executed, Zer-Ilan's attorney concluded
that the interest rate was usurious and the parties entered a modification
retroactively reducing the interest rate from 18% to 10% and reiterating
their intention not to charge usurious interest. After a payment default
and during extended workout negotiations, in April 1995, Zer-Ilan's at-
torney sent a notice letter renouncing Zer-Ilan's right to receive any usu-
rious interest and Ideal waived its rights to compensation under the
consulting agreement. CPDC subsequently filed bankruptcy and the
Chapter 11 trustee filed a complaint against Zer-Ilan and Ideal alleging,
among other things, usury. On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, CPDC argued
that Zer-Ilan and Ideal did not cure the usury violation within sixty days
of actually discovering the violation, as required by statute. 54
CPDC contended that actual discovery occurs when the lender discov-
ered the fact forming the basis of a usury violation, relying on two events:
first, the August 16, 1994 advice of usury from Zer-Ilan's attorney leading
to the modification, and second, the vesting of rights to payment under
the consulting agreement which occurred on October 17, 1994. Appar-
ently, CPDC did not allege (or attempt to prove) that Zer-Ilan had sub-
jective knowledge of the usury violation. The court found the statute
unambiguous and that "actually discovered" may not be interpreted in a
50. Id. at 563-64.
51. Id. at 563-66.
52. In re CPDC, Inc., 337 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2003).
53. Although In re CPDC, Inc. was decided under TEX. REV. CIv. STATS. ANN. art.
5069-1.06(4)(A-B) (Vernon 1993), the applicable text of the statute remains unchanged as
codified in TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 305.103 (Vernon 1998 & Supp. 2004).
54. Such statute provides, in relevant part, that a person has no usury liability if:
"within 60 days after the date the person actually discovers the violation the person cor-
rects the violation." TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 305.103 (Vernon 1998 & Supp. 2004)
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manner that refers to the date when an ordinarily prudent person should
have discovered the violation through reasonable diligence, but rather oc-
curs on the date of the discovery of the violation in fact.55
The court stated that "concerns" which were expressed by Zer-Ilan's
attorneys around the time the notes were executed that the transaction
might be usurious were not sufficient to constitute "actual discovery."
Although not expressly noting what does constitute actual discovery, the
court did state that neither the creditors nor their attorney "concluded"
that usury was present.56 Consequently, it appears that if the creditor or
its attorney reaches a conclusion that usury has occurred, the sixty-day
time period commences. As to what lesser facts would constitute "sub-
jective discovery" will have to be addressed in further decisions or statu-
tory enactments. 57
V. DEBTOR/CREDITOR
National Loan Investors, L.P. v. Robinson58 dealt with an alleged
fraudulent conveyance. National Loan Investors, L.P. (NLI) was the
holder of a note executed by Robinson. Subsequent to executing the
note, Robinson transferred certain stock and real estate to a related en-
tity. NLI filed suit to set aside the transfers as fraudulent conveyances.
At trial, NLI offered evidence to demonstrate that, from a creditor's per-
spective, Robinson did not receive equivalent value for the transfers and
that Robinson was insolvent when the transfers were made. The trial
court refused to admit the evidence on the grounds that value and sol-
vency must be determined from the debtor's perspective. 59 On appeal,
the court cited Texas Business & Commerce Code Section 24.006(a),
which provides in part that "a transfer is fraudulent as to a creditor whose
claim arose before the transfer was made (1) if the debtor made the trans-
fer 'without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange,' and (2)
'the debtor was insolvent at that time or ... became insolvent as a result
of the transfer." 60 The court noted that fraudulent conveyance laws exist
for the benefit of creditors and it is well settled in Texas that the credi-
tor's, not the debtor's, perspective is the relevant focal point when deter-
mining issues of value and solvency. 61
The question of whether the execution of a deed of trust to secure an
antecedent debt constituted a fraudulent conveyance was presented in
First National Bank of Seminole v. Hooper.62 On January 4, 1990, First
National Bank of Seminole (Bank) loaned Ernest Thornton $300,000 to
55. In re CPDC, Inc., 337 F.3d at 442.
56. Id. at 443.
57. Id.
58. Nat'l Loan Investors, L.P. v. Robinson, 98 S.W.3d 781 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2003,
pet. denied).
59. Id. at 782-83.
60. Id. at 783 (quoting TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 24.006(a)).
61. Id. at 784-85.
62. First Nat'l Bank of Seminole v. Hooper, 104 S.W.3d 83 (Tex. 2003).
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consolidate his debt in connection with a twenty-eight-mile gas pipeline
system. To secure the debt, Thornton pledged security interests in ac-
counts, equipment and general intangibles, but not any of the pipe line
easements. In 1993, Hooper obtained a fraud judgment against the
Debtor. Two weeks later, Thornton executed a deed of trust in favor of
the Bank, post-dated as of January 4, 1990 (the original loan date), which
covered the pipeline easements for the entire pipeline system. Hooper
sued the Bank alleging that the execution of the deed of trust lien was a
fraudulent conveyance under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
(TUFIA).63 The trial court found that Thornton, but not the Bank, in-
tended to hinder and defraud Hooper when he granted the deed of trust
lien, that Thornton was insolvent when the transfer occurred, and that the
lien was not exchanged for reasonably equivalent value. The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.64 On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Texas, the court noted that, pursuant to Section 24.009(a) of
TUFrA, notwithstanding a debtor's fraudulent intent, a transfer is not
voidable against a person who received the transfer in good faith and for
reasonably equivalent value. Therefore, the focus was whether reasona-
bly equivalent value was given. TUFIA Section 24.004(a) specifically
provides that value is given for a transfer to secure an antecedent debt.
With respect to the requirement of reasonably equivalent value, both the
trial court and the court of appeals considered the asset transferred to be
the entire pipeline system valued at $700,000. The supreme court dis-
agreed, explaining that what was transferred was not a tangible asset but
merely a lien that had a defined value when it was created. The deed of
trust did not convey the pipeline to the Bank but merely perfected a se-
curity interest in the pipeline up to the amount of Thornton's debt.65 Ac-
cordingly, the value of the asset transferred was no more than Thornton's
pre-existing debt, and the value of the actual collateral is irrelevant. All
other creditors will still have the opportunity to realize the value of the
collateral in excess of the secured party's debt.
In Flores v. Millennium Interests, Ltd.,66 a landowner that signed a con-
tract for deed to buy a vacant lot sued the seller and its account servicer
for violations of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA).67 In
1998, Flores executed a contract for deed. In 2002, Flores became delin-
quent on his regular monthly payments and received several late payment
notices from Millennium through its account servicer, Concord Servicing.
Flores alleged that the late payment notices failed to comply with the
FDCPA.68 The court first noted that the FDCPA regulates companies
that regularly collect debts for third parties. A company collecting debts
in connection with loans that were not in default when the company be-
63. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 24.001-24.012 (Vernon 2002).
64. Hooper, 104 S.W.3d at 84-85.
65. Id. at 86-87.
66. Flores v. Millennium Interests, Ltd., 273 F. Supp. 2d 899 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.077 (Vernon 2003).
68. Flores, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 899-900.
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gan servicing the loans, however, is not a "debt collector" under the
FDCPA. Because Concord Servicing was providing several account man-
agement services to the seller long before Flores' default, Concord Ser-
vicing was not subject to the FDCPA, and therefore, did not need to
furnish any FDCPA mandated data in its notice letters. Although the
court already determined that the FDCPA was inapplicable, the court ad-
dressed Flores' contention that the various notice letters omitted certain
consumers' rights disclosures and therefore, violated the FDCPA. The
court explained that the first letter actually did comply with the FDCPA
and that as long as the initial letter contained the required disclosures,
subsequent letters do not need to repeat the information. 69 With respect
to Texas Property Code Section 5.077, Flores argued that Millennium's
annual account status notices to Flores for 2001 and 2002 failed to contain
certain necessary information, such as the number of payments remaining
and the amount still owed, thereby entitling Flores to statutory damages.
The court ruled that statutory damages are only available when a seller of
a contract for deed fails to send an annual notice, not when the notice
merely omits certain information. In any event, the court noted that Flo-
res neither pleaded nor suffered actual harm from Millennium's
omission. 70
VI. PURCHASER/SELLER
The issue in Joppich v. 1464-Eight, Ltd.71 involved the adequacy of con-
sideration of an option contract. 1464-Eight, Ltd., a property developer,
sold property to Joppich, and the parties simultaneously executed an op-
tion contract granting 1464-Eight, Ltd. an option to repurchase the prop-
erty if Joppich did not begin construction within a certain period of time.
Since construction was not timely commenced, 1464-Eight, Ltd. exercised
its right to repurchase the property. Joppich refused to perform and
1464-Eight, Ltd. filed suit for specific performance. The option contract
contained standard consideration language: "In consideration of the sum
of Ten and No/100 ($10.00) Dollars ('Option Fee') paid in cash by Devel-
oper, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged and
confessed. '72 Joppich alleged the $10 consideration was never paid, rais-
ing a fact issue. The court held that this language was a mere recitation of
consideration, which, as a statement of fact, could be contradicted by pa-
rol evidence; therefore, summary judgment was improper. The court dis-
tinguished this case from other cases in which consideration was given in
addition to the stated dollar amount.73 If the option contract had in-
cluded obligations on the part of 1464-Eight, Ltd., such would have been
additional consideration and 1464-Eight, Ltd. probably would have pre-
69. Id. at 900-01.
70. Id. at 901-02.
71. Joppich v. 1464-Eight, Ltd., 96 S.W.3d 614 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002,
pet. granted).
72. Id. at 615 n.1.
73. Id. at 616-17.
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vailed. Consequently, if the contract does not obligate the optionee to do
anything or does not provide for non-monetary consideration, actual pay-
ment of the stated monetary consideration is mandated. As a practical
matter, it may have been prudent for 1464-Eight, Ltd. to include the right
of repurchase in the deed conveying the property to Joppich, so that the
sale of the land would provide the additional consideration.
Adequacy of consideration was also addressed in Carrico v. Kondos.
7 4
Carrico sold property to Kondos. Three months later, Carrico and
Kondos executed an agreement (ROFR) granting Carrico a right of first
refusal to purchase that same property upon the terms of any offer
Kondos received from a third party. Under the ROFR, Kondos was re-
quired to give Carrico notice of any bona fide third-party offer to
purchase the property. Several years later, Kondos received an offer to
purchase the property from Robbins, who later purchased the property.
Kondos did not send Carrico notice of the offer until after the property
was sold to Robbins. Robbins sued to quiet title and obtain a declaratory
judgment that Robbins owned the property free and clear of any claim
from Carrico. Carrico and Robbins settled that claim, but Carrico
brought a cross-claim against Kondos for breach of the ROFR. Kondos
obtained a summary judgment on the ground that Carrico's action was
barred by the election of remedies doctrine. 75 The appellate court held
that the election of remedies doctrine did not apply, and that whether the
consideration stated in the ROFR (which the court quoted as stating "for
and in consideration of Ten and No/100 Dollars ($10.00) and other good
and valuable consideration") was actually paid was a fact question and
could be controverted by evidence outside of the four corners of the
agreement. 76 Like in Joppich, infra, the court focused on the fact that this
was a "recital of acknowledgment of consideration" and was just a state-
ment of fact. 77
De La Cruz v. Brown,78 is one of three cases in this article involving
contracts for deed.79 The De La Cruz case involved statutory construc-
tion of Texas Property Code Section 5.102 (which was amended in 2001
and renumbered as Section 5.079), which was a matter of first impression
in Texas. Section 5.102(a) required [which subsection was not amended
when renumbered as Section 5.079(a)] that a seller under a contract for
deed record the deed within thirty days after the seller receives the pur-
chaser's final payment. Section 5.102(b) set forth a statutory penalty sell-
ers are required to pay if Section 5.102(a) is violated. Since the subject
cause of action occurred prior to September 1, 2001, the court interpreted
74. Carrico v. Kondos, 111 S.W.3d 582 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied).
75. Id. at 584.
76. Id. at 586.
77. Id. at 587.
78. De La Cruz v. Brown, 109 S.W.3d 73 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2003, pet. granted).
79. In a contract for deed, the seller provides acquisition financing, but title to the
property passes only after all required periodic payments have been made to the seller.
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Section 5.102 rather than Section 5.079.80
De La Cruz purchased property from Brown through a contract for
deed, in which the final payment was made on June 9, 1997. Brown did
not record the deed until March 30, 2001, after De La Cruz sued for dam-
ages under Section 5.102. Brown contended that Section 5.102 did not
give De La Cruz a private cause of action and that the penalty could only
be sought by the Texas Attorney General. The trial court agreed and
granted Brown's motion for summary judgment. 81 The appellate court
considered the legislative history of this statute as originally enacted and
amended. Originally, the statue was introduced to address "colonias,"
which were generally substandard subdivisions along the Texas-Mexico
border; the statute covered certain geographical and income brackets;
and referred to the remedy as a "penalty." Revisions introduced in 2001
removed the income and geographical brackets, extending the provisions
statewide, and replaced the "penalty" language with "liquidated dam-
ages" and a provision for recovery of reasonable attorneys' fees. Brown
contended that the language of the original enactment, which governed in
this case, only authorized the Texas Attorney General to recover penal-
ties and did not provide for a private cause of action, which was permit-
ted only after the 2001 amendments. 82 The court considered Texas
Constitution art. IV, Section 22, defining the powers and duties of the
Texas Attorney General and the provisions of the subject statute as well
as other statutes, concluding that Texas Property Code Section 5.102 did
not contain any language indicating the legislature intended the State of
Texas to collect penalties, unlike numerous other statutory provisions
which made such intent clear in other cases. Furthermore, the legislative
history indicated that the legislation was intended to address problems
which individual purchasers faced when entering into contracts of deeds.
Therefore, the intent of the legislature was for the statute to grant an
individual cause of action.8 3
Malnar v. Mechel184 also involved a contract for deed. Malnar pur-
chased property from Mechell under a contract for deed. After two
years, Malnar defaulted on a payment and received notice of default from
Mechell. When Malnar did not cure the default within thirty days,
Mechell brought an action for trespass to title. The issue in the case was
whether Mechell afforded Malnar the appropriate notice under Texas
Property Code Section 5.062 (now Texas Property Code Section 5.063).
Under former Section 5.062, a purchaser was entitled to receive sixty
days' notice of default if they had paid twenty percent or more of the
purchase price. In all other circumstances, a purchaser was only entitled
to thirty days' notice. The appellate court held that notice was properly
80. It is the authors' belief that the case would have the same outcome had the
amended TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. .§ 5.079 applied.
81. Brown, 109 S.W.3d at 74.
82. Id. at 76-77.
83. Id. at 77-79.
84. Malnar v. Mechell, 91 S.W.3d 924 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet).
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given by Mechell since less than twenty percent of the purchase price had
been paid. It is important to note how the court calculated the percent-
age of payments made by Malnar: any portion of the payments that were
not attributable to principal (here, interest and escrow) were not included
in the calculation of whether twenty percent of the purchase price had
been paid.85 The Malnar case also addressed calculation of time periods
required under the Texas Property Code. The court held that "[i]n com-
puting a period of days under the Texas Property Code, the first day is
excluded from the calculation while the last is included. '86 Since Mechell
rescinded the contract for deed on the thirtieth day after giving notice,
instead of waiting for the thirty-day period to expire, the court held that
Mechell did not comply with the required time period.87
Flores v. Millennium Interests, Ltd.88 involved Texas Property Code
Section 5.077 which governs the sending of annual notices from a seller to
a purchaser under a contract for deed. The seller sent the annual state-
ment required by Section 5.077(a) but left out two of the seven required
pieces of information-the amount paid under the contract and the re-
maining amount owed under the contract.89 Flores brought this claim
seeking the statutory damages provided under Section 5.077(c). The
court held that because the missing information could be calculated by
the remaining information in the statement and because Flores suffered
no actual injury due to the missing information, Flores was not entitled to
recover under Section 5.077(c). In order to recover under Section
5.077(c), the court held that a purchaser must have: (i) received no state-
ment at all, (ii) received a statement that was so deficient that it consti-
tuted no statement at all, or (iii) suffered actual injury resulting from an
omission in an incomplete statement.90
The claim in Davis v. Estridge9 involved a fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion involving the disclosure of foundation problems and structural re-
pairs to a house. The jury found that the sellers committed statutory
fraud in a real estate transaction and awarded the purchasers $2,500 in
damages. The trial court ordered rescission of the contract rather than
awarding the damages found by the jury.92 The appellate court, in hold-
ing that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the contract re-
scinded and reinstating the jury's verdict, made two noteworthy holdings
regarding rescission of a contract. First, a purchaser must give timely no-
tice to the seller that a contract is being rescinded, and the purchaser
must either return or offer to return the property along with the value of
any benefit derived from possession of the property. In this case, in order
85. Id. at 922.
86. Id. at 927-28 (citing TEX. GOV'T. CODE ANN. § 311.014(a) (Vernon 1998)).
87. Id. at 928.
88. Flores v. Millennium Interests, Ltd., 273 F. Supp. 2d 899 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
89. Id. at 899-900.
90. Id. at 901.
91. Davis v. Estridge, 85 S.W.3d 308 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2001, pet. denied).
92. Id. at 309-10.
1172 [Vol. 57
Real Property
to return the parties to status quo, the Estridges, as the purchasers, would
be required to also tender to seller the value the Estridges obtained from
using the property during the period of time between the purchase and
the trial.93 Second, the court described in a footnote what the "[b]enefits
derived from possession of the property" could include: (i) rental value,
(ii) the lease value of the land, (iii) the benefit gained from running cattle,
or (iv) profit from growing a crop.94
Enforcement of specific performance was involved in Limestone
Group, Inc. v. Sai Thong, L.L.C.95 Limestone Group entered into a con-
tract to purchase property from Sai Throng. The contract required
Limestone Group to pay $75,000 earnest money, of which amount only
$25,000 was paid at the time the action was brought. Limestone Group
sought specific performance when the transaction was not completed. In
order to enforce specific performance, the contract provided that Limes-
tone Group must not be in default. Limestone Group argued that only a
material breach could prevent a party from pursuing specific perform-
ance. The court did not disagree with Limestone Group's interpretation
of two cases, but noted that neither of the cases involved a contract that
specifically addressed the party's right of specific performance. 9 6 Since
this contract set forth that Limestone Group must not be in default in
order to enforce specific performance, and since the contract did not in-
clude any language modifying the degree of such default, the court held
that the contract restricted Limestone Group's right to enforce specific
performance. Because Limestone Group was in default, it was not enti-
tled to specific performance. 97
VII. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT
In Miller v. Keyser,98 the sales agent of a homebuilder sold homes that
were subject to a drainage easement. During the course of the sales,
Keyser as the agent, unknowingly misrepresented to the purchasers both
the size of the lots and where the fencing could be placed along the back
of the lots. The purchasers sued both the homebuilder and the sales agent
under the DTPA for such misrepresentations.99 The Texas Supreme
Court noted that the DTPA allows a consumer to bring suit against any
"person," which is broadly defined in the Act, whose false, misleading, or
deceptive acts, or other practices enumerated in the Act, are the produc-
ing cause of the consumer's harm. The sales agent involved had person-
ally participated in each sale and personally made each of the
representations and was the only person with whom the homeowners had
93. Id. at 310-11.
94. Id. at 311 n.3.
95. Limestone Group., Inc. v. Sai Thong, L.L.C., 107 S.W.3d 793 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 2003, no pet.).
96. Id. at 796-97.
97. Id. at 797.
98. Miller v. Keyser, 90 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. 2002).
99. Id. at 714-15.
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any contact. Therefore, he was liable for his own DTPA violations. The
fact that Keyser did not know that his representations were false did not
matter, because the DTPA does not require that the consumer prove the
person acted knowingly or intentionally, just that the misrepresentations
were false and were the producing cause of the consumer's damages. 100
The fact that Keyser was acting solely on behalf of his employer did not
matter; a corporate agent is personally liable for his own fraudulent or
tortious acts. The DTPA protects employees by including an indemnifica-
tion provision that allows an agent to seek indemnity from his employer if
he was truly just passing along company information. Such indemnity
provision is further evidence of the legislature's intent to hold agents lia-
ble for their own misrepresentations, regardless of their status as
agents.'01
In Bennett v. Bank United,10 2 Bennett financed the purchase of a resi-
dence and agreed to reimburse the mortgage company for the private
mortgage insurance (PMI) premiums on an insurance policy the company
obtained for its own benefit. No provision in the deed of trust allowed
Bennett to terminate the PMI payments, but instead required the PMI
premium as part of her monthly escrow payments "until the Note is paid
in full" and reimbursement of the premium amount "until such time as
the requirement for such insurance terminates in accordance with Bor-
rower's and Lender's written agreement or applicable law."' 10 3 After pay-
ing the premiums for almost twenty years, Bennett requested the Bank,
as the loan servicer, to discontinue charging for PMI since Bennett had
achieved a loan-to-value ratio below the amount which typically requires
PMI premiums. First Boston Mortgage, the holder of the deed of trust,
refused to cancel the requirement, and Bennett sued under the DTPA.
Bennett was considered a consumer because the loan, with its require-
ment of PMI, was incidental to the purchase of the residence, which is a
good; therefore, the Bank became connected to Bennett's transaction and
subject to the DTPA's provisions. However, the Bank's actions were not
unconscionable because they committed no "glaringly noticeable, fla-
grant, complete and unmitigated" action against Bennett and First Bos-
ton Mortgage was under no obligations to cancel the PMI.10 4 The court
further found that the Bank's failure to provide Bennett with written no-
tice of her possible right to cancel the PMI, as required under the insur-
ance code, was not unconscionable, because Bennett had already
expressly agreed to pay the premiums, and therefore could suffer no in-
jury from the lack of notice. Lastly, the court would not allow Bennett to
claim third-party-beneficiary status to achieve standing to sue for viola-
tions of the DTPA because there was no evidence that the contract lan-
100. Id. at 716.
101. Id. at 718-19.
102. Bennett v. Bank United, 114 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.).
103. Id. at 78.
104. Id. at 82.
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guage in any way indicated that the contract was to her benefit. 10 5
Allison v. Fire Insurance Exchange,'0 6 involved an insured home-
owner's suit against its insurance company for numerous claims, including
deceptive trade practices. Ballard bought a large house and insured it
with FIE. Ballard began noticing plumbing leaks and filed insurance
claims for repairs. The problems continued, and eventually Ballard
moved her family out of the house after finding evidence of mold. Bal-
lard then filed suit against FIE for breach of contract, deceptive trade
practices, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in the claims
handling process, and negligence. Ballard's causes of action revolved
around the following acts: (1) FIE's statement that "complete" plumbing
tests had been performed on the house, when in fact the tests were com-
plete according to the standards of the plumbing company, (2) a letter
from FIE's claims adjuster stating that FIE required a forty-five day ex-
tension to complete the claim investigation, when the adjuster later testi-
fied the extension was necessary only for her to obtain authority to pay
the claim, and (3) FIE's refusal to pay the claims once it obtained all the
information it needed to pay the claims. After the jury found that FIE
violated the DTPA in numerous ways, the court of appeals reviewed the
sufficiency of the evidence. 10 7 The court found that the letter regarding
the "complete" plumbing tests was some evidence to support the jury's
finding of a DTPA violation, because the jury could have reasonably con-
cluded that the characterization of the test was a misrepresentation of the
work performed and that Ballard's reliance on such characterization
caused further damages. However the court found insufficient evidence
to support the jury's finding that FIE engaged in an unconscionable ac-
tion or course of action, noting that not every misrepresentation of fact,
even if intentional, constitutes unconscionable conduct. The record does
not provide evidence that the consumer was taken advantage of to a
grossly unfair degree, which is the requirement for a finding of uncon-
scionable conduct. Lastly, the court found there was no evidence to sup-
port the jury's finding that FIE knowingly engaged in deceptive acts or
practices. "Knowingly" means actual awareness of the falsity, unfairness,
or deception of the conduct, and is more than conscious indifference.
Since the DTPA requires the finding of a "knowing" violation to uphold
punitive and mental anguish damages, and since there was no evidence of
such a violation in this case, the court reversed the jury's awards for those
damages. 108
In Branton v. Wood, 10 9 Branton purchased a home from Wood. The
home was located in a flood plain with a history of flood damage, and
Wood had recently made extensive repairs after the latest flood. After
the purchase, a flood washed the house completely off its foundation into
105. Id. at 84-85.
106. Allison v. Fire Ins. Exch., 98 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet. abated).
107. Id. at 234-37.
108. Id. at 251-52, 256-58.
109. Branton v. Wood, 100 S.W.3d 645, 646 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.).
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neighboring trees, causing irreparable damage. An expert inspected the
home and concluded that the damage had occurred because the founda-
tion bottom which attached the house to the foundation had rotted from
prior flood damage. Branton sued under the DTPA, alleging that Wood
violated the DTPA in numerous ways, specifically asserting that the
house did not comply with representations made before the sale. In the
"Seller's Disclosure of Property Condition," Wood stated that "repairs
were made totally after flooding occurred."1 10 Branton claimed that this
representation was a false, misleading or deceptive act because the inci-
dent would not have occurred but for appellee's failure to repair the rot-
ten wood. The expert reported that "[i]n inspecting further, it became
evident to me that the structure had sustained previous water damage to
the plates allowing them to rot and weaken so much as to allow the struc-
ture to lift and float off the slab." '' The court noted that to constitute
competent, non-conclusory summary judgment evidence, an expert must
explain the basis of his statements to link his conclusions to the facts.
Because the expert's report in this case had no factual support underlying
the opinions, the court found that the statement was conclusory in nature
and not competent summary judgment evidence to establish the DTPA
claim. It did not prove that the base plates were rotten because of previ-
ous damage or that such damage was not repaired after the previous
flood, and it failed to discount other plausible sources of the cause of the
rotting of the base plates. Because Branton failed to produce evidence of
a false, misleading, or deceptive act, the court held that the trial court did
not err in granting Wood's motion for partial summary judgment. 1 2
VIII. LEASES
Two cases were decided involving the outdoor sign industry. The first
case dealt with the enforceability of a restrictive covenant contained in a
lease, and the second case dealt with the adequacy of notice prior to ter-
mination of a lease.
In Reagan National Advertising of Austin, Inc. v. Capital Outdoors,
Inc.,113 the issue before the court was the enforceability of a restrictive
covenant contained in a lease. Reagan National Advertising (Reagan)
leased a billboard from Met NYTEX, Ltd. (Met). The lease contained a
provision prohibiting Met from releasing the premises to any other adver-
tiser for five years if Reagan's lease was not renewed. Met did not renew
Reagan's lease. Approximately two months prior to the expiration of
Reagan's lease, Met sold a perpetual and assignable easement to Capital
Outdoors, Inc. (Capital) to build and maintain a billboard on the same
site. After attempting to sue the City of Austin and Met without success,
110. Id. at 647.
111. Id. at 648.
112. Id. at 648-49.
113. Reagan Nat'l Adver. of Austin, Inc. v. Capital Outdoors, Inc., 96 S.W.3d 490 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2002) (review granted judgment vacated).
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Reagan sued Capital seeking to enforce the lease clause against Capital.
The court of appeals held that neither Met nor Capital violated the re-
striction on releasing the site since Met conveyed an easement to Capital
and the clause only prohibited releasing.1 1 4
In Outdoor Systems, Inc. v. BBE, L.L.C.,115 Outdoor Systems, Inc.
(Outdoor) was the lessor of two tracts of land in Dallas County, Texas on
which it maintained two billboards. Outdoor ground leased this land
from BBE, L.L.C (BBE), which acquired the pre-existing ground leases
on June 29, 1999, from the prior owner, Sun NLF Limited Partnership
(Sun). On or about June 28, 1999, Sun sent a letter to Outdoor stating
that the land had been sold and to send its future rent payments to BBE.
Prior to receiving this notice, Outdoor had already sent its July, 1999 rent
payment to Sun. On July 2, 1999, BBE sent Outdoor a letter stating sim-
ply that all future rent payments should be made to BBE. An employee
of Outdoor contacted an employee of BBE and asked that it be permit-
ted to reissue the July check and send it with the August payment. BBE's
employee indicated that he would get back to her. Instead, on July 16,
1999, BBE sent a second letter to Outdoor stating that it did not receive
its July rent payment and that it had discovered a discrepancy in the man-
ner in which Outdoor had calculated the amount it owed in rent in the
past and demanded that Outdoor (i) pay the total amount of arrearages
from the miscalculation beginning with the leases inceptions and (ii) pro-
vide BBE with all advertising contracts utilized for these billboards from
the inception of the leases. Outdoor tendered both the July and August
rent payments to BBE which were both rejected. BBE sent Outdoor a
notice of termination on August 11, 1999.116
The court held that in order for there to be a "default" under the
leases, BBE was required to give Outdoor written notice specifying the
default. The court also noted that where forfeiture of a lease is dependent
on making of a demand for performance (which was the case in this
lease), that demand must be a proper, specific and reasonable one. Addi-
tionally, the notice of default in payment of rent must convey a message
that the notifier is initiating steps necessary to finally assert his legal
rights that if default is not cured, he may take final action as provided in
the contract. The court held that the July 2 letter made no demand and
the July 16 letter demanded too much as the "demand was not specific
but was excessive, unreasonable, imprecise, and required [Outdoor] to
perform acts not required by the leases [the provision to BBE of the ad-
vertising contracts]"11 7 and as such, the August 11 termination notice sent
by BBE was ineffective because it was not preceded by a proper notice of
default.
114. Id. at 493-95.
115. Outdoor Sys., Inc. v. BBE, L.L.C., 105 S.W.3d 66 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2003, pet.
denied).
116. Id. at 69-70, 72.
117. Id. at 71.
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The next two cases addressed the fact that a right of first refusal is a
dormant option that springs to life upon an offer to sell/purchase the sub-
ject property and that the terms of the right and the actions of the right
holder should be carefully considered.
In A.G.E., Inc. v. Buford,118 Buford acquired a piece of commercial
property subject to a pre-existing ground lease. The lease contained a
right of first refusal granting the lessee the option to buy the property on
the same terms as any contemplated sale. No notice of the sale to Buford
was given to the then-current tenant, Mid Texas Bancshares, Inc. (Mid
Texas). When Mid Texas was finally made aware of the conveyance to
Buford, Mid Texas threatened to file suit to enforce its right of first re-
fusal unless Buford consented to a new sublease. Buford consented to
the requested sublease to A.G.E., Inc. (AGE). Three years later, Mid
Texas assigned all of its leasehold interest to AGE, and AGE notified
Buford that it intended to exercise the right of first refusal contained in
the lease with respect to Buford's acquisition of the property. Buford
responded by (i) notifying AGE by letter that the right of first refusal was
no longer viable as Mid Texas earlier declined to exercise its option in
exchange for Buford granting the original sublease to AGE and (ii) that
he was terminating the lease due to AGE's failure to provide certificates
of insurance relating the insurance coverage on the leased property.
AGE sued Buford seeking actual damages, specific performance of its
purchase option and attorney's fees."19
The court held that a holder of a right of first refusal must elect to
either purchase the property or decline to purchase it and allow the
owner to sell it to another. The court stated, however, that the option is
not perpetual; and the right holder must choose between exercising it or
acquiescing in the transfer of the property. Additionally, the court held
that when a right holder learns of a sale in violation of its right, it again
has the opportunity to either accept or reject within the time specified in
the operative agreement, just as if the sale had been properly noticed.1 20
In this instance, Mid Texas, in exchange for Buford's consent to the sub-
lease, elected to effectively decline its option to purchase the property by
failing to prosecute the claim any further. By allowing its option to lapse
after learning of the sale to Buford, Mid Texas had no such right concern-
ing the sale of the property to assign to AGE, and all subsequent at-
tempts by AGE to exercise an option against Buford were without legal
effect and thus ineffective. 12'
In Comeaux v. Suderman,t2 2 Comeaux held a right of first refusal on
property used by Comeaux as a public fishing pier pursuant to a lease
between Comeaux and Suderman. The terms of the lease required Sud-
118. A.G.E., Inc. v. Buford, 105 S.W.3d 667 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, pet. denied).
119. Id. at 671-72.
120. Id. at 673.
121. Id. at 675.




erman to notify Lessee in writing of the "true and complete terms and
conditions of any proposed sale to a third party" at least 90 days prior to
the sale, at which point Comeaux would have 30 days from receipt of the
notice to purchase the property at the offered terms. 12 3 On March 30,
1997, Suderman notified Comeaux of an offer to purchase the leased
premises and a certain amount of adjoining property for the amount of
$350,000. The notice did not specify the total acreage to be sold, but in-
structed Comeaux to call Suderman's real estate agent if he was inter-
ested in purchasing the property. After speaking with the real estate
agent, Comeaux informed Suderman that he would not exercise his rights
due to the amount of the purchase price. Suderman subsequently sold
the property, including the leased premises, to a third party. Comeaux
continued to lease the premises from the new owner until the fall of 1998,
at which time the fishing pier was destroyed by a storm. At this time,
Comeaux filed suit against Suderman and the new owners, alleging that
Suderman failed to comply with the terms of the right of first refusal and
tortiously interfered with his right to exercise the right. The trial court
granted summary judgment against Comeaux without explanation. 124
On appeal, Comeaux asserted that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment for several reasons, including that he was never given
notice that he could have purchased just the leased premises, he was
never given the opportunity to purchase just the leased premises, and the
notice was not in compliance with the lease requirements because it did
not reveal all of the terms of the sale and was received less than ninety
days prior to the sale. In response to Comeaux's argument concerning
sufficiency of the lease, the court concluded that the notice was not defec-
tive because Comeaux had the opportunity to obtain all of the terms of
the offer, and actually affirmatively declined to exercise his rights. In its
analysis, the court distinguished between an option to purchase and a
right of first refusal by stating that a right of first refusal only ripens into
an option when the property owner elects to sell. Therefore, the right is
not ripe until the right holder receives notice of a proposed sale. 125 In
this case, because Comeaux received a valid, if not completely clear, no-
tice, and affirmatively declined his rights after speaking with Suderman's
real estate agent, he waived his right and thereby allowed Suderman to
freely sell the property. The court reasoned that it did not need to con-
sider whether Comeaux should have been offered the right to only
purchase the leased premises and whether the notice may have been tech-
nically deficient, because he had actual notice of the sale and chose to
decline his right. The court held that when a property owner makes a
reasonable disclosure to the holder of a right of first refusal, that right
holder has a duty to undertake a reasonable investigation of any unclear
123. Id. at 217.
124. Id. at 217-18.
125. Id. at 219-20.
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terms. 126 Because Comeaux simply declined the offer without clarifying
the unclear terms, he was barred from later complaining about the suffi-
ciency of the notice. The Court therefore overruled Comeaux's point of
error and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
IX. ADVERSE POSSESSION
In Louisiana Pacific Corp. v. Holmes,127 many of the facts on which the
jury relied in granting title to the claimant were consistent with the ad-
verse possession claim (e.g., open and notorious possession, attempting to
stop other's activities on the land, continuous possession for the statute of
limitations period, and one that is not so common, such as firing shots at
others to prevent them from coming on the land), yet the jury did not put
any weight on the set of facts upon which the appellate court relied in
reversing the trial court. The most salient of these facts was that the
claimant and fee owner had a landlord/tenant relationship that was spe-
cifically recognized by the adverse possession claimant. The court
pointed out that in the event of the existence of a landlord/tenant rela-
tionship, in order to claim adverse possession, the tenant/claimant must
prove that there was a repudiation of the relationship, assert a claim of
right adverse to the owner, and show that notice of such repudiation had
been given to the owner. 128 Here, the claimant admitted in the trial court
that he was a tenant and never made it known to the fee owner that he
claimed the property as a non-tenant. The claimant on several occasions
had actually requested a reduction in the rent payments and sought an
easement from the fee owner for an electrical line. In addition, the claim-
ant actually paid the owner for timber that the claimant had harvested on
portions of the fee property. These facts were sufficient for the appellate
court to reverse the trial court because such facts are in direct contraven-
tion to the claimant's assertion that his title was adverse to the owner's or
that the lease has been repudiated.129
X. DEEDS AND CONVEYANCES
Herman v. Shell Oil Co.1 30 involved an option agreement granting Shell
the option to purchase a tract of land. The option further provided that if
Shell purchased such property, no other gas stations would be allowed on
a surrounding eight-acre tract of property. Shell exercised its option, and
the deed contained the gas station restriction, but the affected property
included twenty acres rather than the original eight acres contemplated
by the option agreement. Herman, the owner of certain property within
126. Id. at 221.
127. La. Pac. Corp. v. Holmes, 94 S.W.3d 834 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet.
denied).
128. Id. at 839.
129. Id. at 840.
130. Herman v. Shell Oil Co., 93 S.W.3d 605 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no
pet.).
1180 [Vol. 57
the twenty-acre area, brought this claim to quiet title and for slander of
title, relating to damages claimed by Herman after he was unable to re-
new a lease with a major supermarket retailer wanting to develop a gas
station on its leased premises. The court held that even though Herman's
deed was not expressly subject to the restriction, Herman had construc-
tive notice of the restriction since it appeared in Herman's chain of
title.131
In Earwood v. Smart,132 Earwood and Walker owned adjoining prop-
erty. After having his property resurveyed, Walker found that a vacancy
existed between the two properties. To settle the claim as to who owned
this vacancy, Earwood purchased the surface rights of the property from
Walker, and the deed reserved the mineral rights to Walker. Many years
later, gas was discovered on the "vacancy" property. Earwood claimed
ownership of the mineral rights, arguing that no vacancy existed and that
the property was his all along. Walker's successors-in-interest provided
evidence that a vacancy did in fact exist, and further claimed that
Earwood was estopped by the deed from claiming he owned the property
all along. The court agreed with Walker's successors-in-interest and held
that Earwood was estopped from claiming he owned the property, stating
"recitals in a deed are binding only when the parties thereto claim under
such deed. 1 33
XI. EASEMENTS
In Stephenson v. Vastar Resources, Inc.,134 surface owners sued a pipe-
line operator to enjoin it from using and operating a pipeline across their
land and to terminate the easement granting the pipeline right-of-way.
Stephenson claimed that the easement had terminated and that Vastar
had not complied with the easement and could not transmit oil and gas
through the pipelines which comes from sources outside of the land which
is a part of the mineral estate. Vastar owned the fee mineral estate under
a large area of land, and Stephenson owned the surface estate over a
small portion of that land. The pipeline was originally installed pursuant
to an easement granted in 1924, which provided that the party had the
right-of-way to "construct, maintain, operate, repair and remove an oil
and gas pipeline ... over, through and upon" certain lands, and granted
them the right to lay a second pipeline adjacent to the first pipeline for
the same purposes.135 Another pipeline was laid pursuant to rights and
mineral estate ownership reserved under 1916 deeds, which expressly re-
served from the conveyance the right to all oil and gas and "perpetual
rights of ingress and egress to prospect for, take, use, enjoy and remove"
131. Id. at 608.
132. Earwood v. Smart, 107 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied).
133. Id. at 5.
134. Stephenson v. Vastar Res., Inc., 89 S.W.3d 790, 791 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2002, pet. denied).
135. Id. at 792.
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the same. 136 The 1924 easement stated that the easement would end if
not used for a period of two years, but didn't define the words "not
used." Stephenson claimed that such easement terminated because of a
two-year period of non-use when the previous owner deactivated and
purged gas from a section of the pipeline, but continued to use the pipe-
line until it sold that section and easement right to Vastar. The continued
use was evidenced in several ways, including the maintaining, inspection,
and keeping up the pipeline and right-of-way, and the owner's continued
use of the pipeline across the other lands under the 1924 easement. The
court found that, as a matter of law, the undisputed facts precluded termi-
nation of the easement under the non-use provisions of the easement. 137
As new telecommunication systems come into mainstream use, old
easement language is challenged to "keep up," as these next two cases
demonstrate. Property owners sued a cable company for trespass and
negligence when the cable company placed its cable lines over their prop-
erty pursuant to an easement granted to the utility company in Marcus
Cable Associates, L.P. v. Krohn.138 The easement in question permitted
the holder to use the private property for the purpose of constructing and
maintaining an "electric transmission or distribution line or system."'1 39
The electric company who held the easement entered into a "Joint Use
Agreement" with a cable-television provider, which later assigned its
rights to Marcus Cable Associates, L.P. (Marcus Cable). Under the
agreement, Marcus Cable could attach its cable lines to the utility com-
pany's poles. The Krohns, who owned the property, sued Marcus Cable,
alleging that they did not have a valid easement and had placed the wires
over their property without their knowledge or consent, asserting trespass
and that Marcus Cable was negligent in failing to obtain their consent
before installing the lines. The Krohns sought an injunction ordering the
wires' removal and actual and exemplary damages.140 The Texas Su-
preme Court stated that the scope of the interest conveyed is determined
by the contracting parties' intentions, as expressed in the grant. No rights
are implied, unless they are reasonably necessary to fairly enjoy those
rights that are expressly granted. 141 While the easement's use may
change over time to accommodate technological development, such
changes must still be within the purposes for which the easement was
originally created. Even if a public benefit would result from the changed
use of the easement, or such new use does not materially increase the
burden to the servient estate, the courts cannot circumvent the parties'
intent by disregarding an easement's express terms and purpose. 142
136. Id. at 793.
137. Id. at 794.
138. Marcus Cable Assocs., L.P. v. Krohn, 90 S.W.3d 697, 699 (Tex. 2002).
139. Id. at 699.
140. Id. at 699-700.
141. Id. at 700-01.
142. Id. at 701-03.
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The supreme court found that the grant of an easement for the purpose
of constructing and maintaining an "electric transmission or distribution
line or system" did not include the use of cable television lines, because at
the time of the conveyance those words were commonly associated with
the conveyance of electricity only. The court refused to broaden this
meaning for public policy reasons to embrace modern developments such
as cable, as other cases have, because in those cases the grant involved
was more broad, and involved easements for communications media as
well. 143 The court also found that Section 181.102 of the Texas Utilities
Code, which permits cable companies to install lines on a utility ease-
ment, does not apply to private easement grants because the language of
the statute implies that it is discussing only those properties that are gen-
erally dedicated to public use, the legislative history supports such inter-
pretation, and such interpretation avoids constitutional infirmities.14 4
Justice Hecht filed a dissenting opinion analyzing the majority's opinion
and stating that he would hold that the easement could be shared with a
cable television provider based on the development of cable television
since the easement was granted, as long as the servient estate would not
be additionally burdened. 1 45
Corley v. Entergy Corp. ,146 involved the interest granted by an ease-
ment in connection with the extension of electrical power infrastructure.
The four easements involved were of the following four types: (1) elec-
tricity only, (2) electricity and Entergy's internal communications, (3)
electricity and telephone, and (4) electricity and communications. It was
undisputed that all four of the easements contemplated use of the prop-
erty for the transmission of electricity, and that the last three types of
easements expressly granted the right to use the property for the trans-
mission of internal communications related to the transmission of elec-
tricity.147 The issues were whether any of the easements allowed the use
of plaintiffs' property to transmit communications between third parties
unrelated to Entergy's internal communications, and whether the first
type of easement granted by implication the right to use the property for
the transmission of internal communications related to the transmission
of electricity. The court found that the defendant's use of any of the four
easements to transmit third party communications was not a right inci-
dental to the right in the easements to transmit electricity, and was not
necessary for Entergy to fully enjoy the express grant in the easements to
transmit electricity. Even if the proposed use does not materially in-
crease the burden on the servient estates, it is still an unauthorized pres-
ence if it does not serve the easement's express purpose. 148
143. Id. at 703-06.
144. Id. at 706-07.
145. Id. at 708 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
146. Corley v. Entergy Corp., 246 F. Supp. 2d 565, 567-568 (E.D. Tex. 2003).
147. Id. at 570-71.
148. Id. at 575-76.
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The court found that the first type of easement (for "electricity only")
expressly conveyed the right to install the "usual fixtures" for the trans-
mission of electricity, which includes lines of communication necessary to
control the electric current. The court further found that the incidental
use doctrine entitled Entergy to also use that easement for constructing,
operating and maintaining a system for controlling the flow of the elec-
tricity that it had an easement to transmit. Therefore, an internal com-
munications system was necessary for the full enjoyment of the electrical
easement, and Entergy could install a network for the transmission of its
internal communications. However, such use was limited by the object
and purpose of the easement, which was to transmit electricity, and there-
fore the network could not be used to transmit third party communica-
tions. 149 As to the language of the second type of easement (for
"electricity and Entergy's internal communications") allowed use of the
network for internal communications, but limited such use to grantee's
communications. Therefore the network could not be used for any com-
munications other than Entergy's, and it could not be used for the trans-
mission of third party communications unrelated to Entergy's internal
communication needs. 150
The third type of easement (permitting "telephone or telegraph" com-
munications) allowed the use of such easement for both internal commu-
nications and third party voice and data communications, as such use is
simply a technologically advanced means of accomplishing the communi-
cative purpose. However, in discussing the use of the easement for cable-
television, the court noted that under Texas law the question is not
whether the proposed use results in an increased burden on the servient
estate, but whether the grant's terms authorize the proposed use. The
court found that the use of the easement for cable-television was not con-
sistent with the ordinary meaning of the easement. 151 Lastly, the fourth
type of easement (allowing "communications") did not limit the ease-
ment grant to grantee's internal use. Given the ordinary meaning of the
term "communications," it would appear to include not only voice and
data, but also video transmission.' 52
The court further found that Texas Public Utility Code Section 181.007,
which provides that a gas or electric corporation has the power to own,
hold, or use easements as necessary for the purpose of the corporation,
does not limit the uses for which utilities can hold property obtained by
voluntary agreement. The court also found that Texas Public Utility
Code Sections 163.013(a) and 163.014, which discuss the statutory powers
of joint agencies, have no bearing on the easement issues, and do not
generally apply to electric utilities. 53
149. Id. at 576-77.
150. Id. at 577-78.
151. Id. at 578.
152. Id. at 578-79.
153. Id. at 579-82.
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XII. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, CONDOMINIUMS AND
OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS
The Court in Air Park-Dallas Zoning Committee v. Crow Billingsley
Airpark, Ltd.154 addressed the issues of (1) whether an owner's forfeiture
of voting rights under restrictive covenants applied to all lots owned by
the owner and (2) whether laches prevented a zoning committee's right of
first refusal on the sale of lots in a neighborhood. The zoning committee
argued that Billingsley, the owner of thirty-two lots in the neighborhood,
was precluded from running in the zoning committee election because
Billingsley had lost its voting rights for non-compliance with the restric-
tive covenants. The restrictive covenant provided that the zoning com-
mittee had the right to suspend an owner's right to participate in any
election for non-compliance with the covenants and restrictions or con-
tract. 15 5 The court agreed that the zoning committee had the authority to
prevent Billingsley from participating in zoning committee elections with
respect to its non-complying lots. However, the court found that because
the deed restrictions provided that each owner is entitled to one vote per
lot, the zoning committee could not prevent Billingsley from participating
in the election with respect to the lots that were in compliance. 15 6 The
zoning committee also urged the court to grant specific performance to
the zoning committee in exercising a right of first refusal with respect to
certain lots owned by Billingsley. Billingsley argued that the failure of
the zoning committee to assert its right of first refusal for two years was
unreasonable and that Billingsley had paid taxes on the property for sev-
eral years based on the failure of the zoning committee to assert its right
of first refusal. The court agreed with Billingsley's arguments and ruled
that the zoning committee was precluded from asserting its right of first
refusal as to the lots owned by Billingsley. 157
XIII. HOMESTEAD
In re Bouchie158 involved a question of first impression with respect to
the applicability of homestead laws. The creditors challenged the bank-
ruptcy court finding, as affirmed by the district court, that all approximate
eighty-four acres of land owned by the debtor is a rural homestead under
Texas law. The creditors claimed that such a determination should be
based, at least in part, on the "multiple factors" test adopted in United
States v. Blakeman.159 The court concluded that the Blakeman approach
does not consider the 1999 amendments to Section 41.002(c) of the Texas
Property Code, and, hence, that section is "the exclusive vehicle for dis-
154. Air Park-Dallas Zoning Comm. v. Crow Billingsley Airpark, Ltd., 109 S.W.3d 900
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.).
155. Id. at 904-05.
156. Id. at 909-10.
157. Id. at 911.
158. In re Bouchie, 324 F.3d 780 (5th Cir. 2003).
159. United States v. Blakeman, 977 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1992).
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tinguishing between rural and urban homesteads."' 160
In a rather lengthy opinion, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in In re
Perry,16 a held that it is not necessarily the case that a business of any kind
can never be part of a rural homestead, and that the court is "unable to
say that Texas would necessarily adopt such an unequivocal statement
regarding the effect of business activity on a single contiguous piece of
rural homestead property as never being a part of a rural homestead. 1 62
Neither the Texas Property Code nor the Texas Constitution prohibits a
rural resident from operating a business on the property on which he re-
sides; however, because the traditional business operation on a rural
homestead is agricultural, the Texas Supreme Court had not yet had the
opportunity to review a case involving (1) a rural resident, (2) claiming
rural property that is (3) on the same tract as his residence and (4) which
is used for non-agricultural business purposes. The court does note, how-
ever, that several lower-level courts have faced this issue. The court un-
equivocally stated that it would not hold that the operation of a business
without more, "necessarily forfeits a rural homestead interest."'1 63 In the
case at bar, the debtor had leased a portion of his rural property for the
use of a mobile home park, and lived on a separate part of the property.
The court pointed out that one who rents a portion of the property to
others on a continuous basis abandons that portion of the property for
the purposes of homestead laws because the individual claiming home-
stead evidences an intention to abandon such land for homestead pur-
poses. However, renting property may not always necessarily be for a
permanent time period and, indeed, some leases are done on a temporary
basis, in which case the homestead is not abandoned. The court stated
that although it could not "agree that the operation of a non-agricultural
business on a rural homestead necessarily sacrifices the homestead char-
acter of that portion of the property," it was not willing to go any further
and state that by operating a mobile home park, the landowner does not
abandon that tract for homestead purposes. 164 As a result, the court re-
manded the case for a determination on that particular issue.
XIV. BROKERS
In Miller v. Keyser,165 the Supreme Court of Texas held that a
homebuilder's sales agent was individually subject to the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act ("DTPA"), and therefore was individually liable for misrep-
resentations made to the plaintiffs, but had the right to seek statutory
contributions or indemnification from his employer. For a more com-
160. In re Bouchie, 324 F.3d at 785.
161. In re Perry, 345 F.3d. 303 (5th Cir. 2003).
162. Id. at 315.
163. Id. at 318.
164. Id. at 319.
165. Miller v. Keyser, 90 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. 2002).
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plete discussion, refer to the Deceptive Trade Practices Act section of this
article.
In Gonzales v. American Title Co. of Houston,16 6 the broker of a home-
owner was not the agent of the buyer of the homeowner's promissory
note and deed of trust. In May 1997, Gonzales applied for and obtained a
home loan from Woodforest Bancshares, Inc. (Woodforest). Several
months later, Woodforest transferred the loan and deed of trust to Re-
source Bancshares Mortgage Group (RBMG). RBMG notified Gonzales
that the monthly payment would be higher than Gonzales contemplated,
which included amounts for principal, interest, and private mortgage in-
surance (PMI). 167
Gonzales filed suit against several defendants, including RBMG, alleg-
ing against RBMG claims of misrepresentation, fraud, fraud in the in-
ducement, conspiracy, violations of both the Deceptive Trade Practices
Act and Consumer Protection Act, and unauthorized PMI charges. Cen-
tral to Gonzales's claims against RBMG was the theory that Woodforest
was RBMG's agent in making the loans. The basis for Gonzales's agency
claim was that Woodforest had sent the loan applications to RBMG,
which had then determined (i) the loan's interest rate, (ii) the monthly
loan payment, and (iii) whether PMI would be required, and had gener-
ally controlled the actions of Woodforest throughout the transaction. The
court rejected this claim, noting that although a "wholesale mortgage
agreement" existed between Woodforest and RBMG allowing Wood-
forest to sell loans to RBMG, this agreement did not require such a sale,
and specifically disclaimed an agency relationship between the parties.1 68
The court noted that no evidence existed indicating that either Wood-
forest was authorized to act for RBMG, or that Woodforest was "subject
to the control" of RBMG, two central elements of an agency claim. The
court therefore held that RBMG was not responsible for the actions
against Woodforest. 169
XV. TITLE INSURANCE
In Hispanic Housing & Education Corp. v. Chicago Title Insurance
Co.,170 the court affirmed the trial court's ruling that a title company was
not liable when an updated title commitment disclosed a pre-existing lien
not disclosed on its previous commitment. In that case, eight months af-
ter the first commitment was issued, the title company issued an updated
commitment which disclosed on Schedule C a lien in the amount of
$650,000 that was not shown on the original commitment (the lien had
been filed prior to the original commitment, and the lien had in fact been
166. Gonzales v. Am. Title Co. of Houston, 104 S.W.3d 588 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st.
Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
167. Id. at 591-92.
168. Id. at 593.
169. Id.
170. Hispanic Hous. & Educ. Corp. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 97 S.W.3d 150 (Tex.
App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 2002, pet. denied).
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paid off, though no release had been recorded.) The sale of the property
never occurred and no policy was ever issued. The plaintiff argued that
the statements in the first title commitment were affirmative representa-
tions and that the title company's failure to include the existing lien on
the first title commitment and its inclusion in the second commitment
were negligent misrepresentations upon which the plaintiff relied. 17' The
court disposed of plaintiff's argument on the basis that a title company's
only duty is to indemnify the insured against losses for defects in title, not
to point out any outstanding encumbrances (although the court noted
that in cases in which a title company makes affirmative representa-
tions-e.g., when a commitment affirmatively represents that there are
no restrictions of record-there may be liability under the DTPA or oth-
erwise). 172 The plaintiff did not argue the DTPA, and the court found
that there were no affirmative representations on Schedule C.173
Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Hadnot174 addressed when an action ac-
crues under a title policy for purposes of the statute of limitations.
Hadnot purchased a newly constructed house in the spring of 1994 and
procured a title insurance policy from the defendant. Shortly after receiv-
ing lien claims from subcontractors, Hadnot submitted a claim to the title
company, which denied payment. The subcontractors sued and prevailed
against Hadnot in November, 1995. A second and third letter requesting
coverage was sent to the title company, followed by a fourth letter in
February, 1998, after the amounts owed to the subcontractors were final-
ized. Each time coverage was denied. Hadnot brought suit against the
title company in August, 2001, alleging that the limitations period did not
begin to run until the title company rejected the second proof of loss
claim, since they did not sustain "out of pocket" losses until the suit with
the contractors was final. Summary judgment was granted to the home-
owners. 175 However, on appeal, the court reversed, holding that the stat-
ute began to run on the date coverage was first denied, since the injury to
the insured was not just the refusal to pay the claim but also the refusal to
defend the suit.176
XVI. CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS, MECHANICS LIEN AND
CONSTRUCTION ISSUES
In J.M. Krupar Construction Co. v. Rosenberg,177 the homeowner
brought suit against the general contractor, Abercombie Builders, Inc.
(Abercombie), and the subcontractor, JMK Construction (JMK), for vio-
171. Id. at 151-52.
172. Id. at 153-54.
173. Id. at 154.
174. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Hadnot, 101 S.W.3d 642 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist
Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
175. Id. at 643-44.
176. Id. at 646.
177. J.M. Krupar Constr. Co. v. Rosenberg, 95 S.W.3d 322 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
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lations of the Texas Residential Construction Liability Act and the DTPA
stemming from damages allegedly resulting from faulty design and con-
struction of the foundation of his home. The trial court rendered judg-
ment in favor of Rosenberg against Abercombie and JMK and in favor of
Abercombie against JMK. 178 The appellate court ruled that the two year
statute of limitations had expired and was not tolled by the discovery
rule. The DTPA incorporates the discovery rule into the statute, provid-
ing that the claim accrues when the consumer discovered or in the exer-
cise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the occurrence of the
false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice. 179 Here, the court ruled
that the homeowner knew or reasonably should have known of the faulty
foundation almost three years earlier when he had two separate inspec-
tions done on the foundation to investigate cracks in the walls. Both in-
spection reports had stated there was likely foundation problems possibly
caused by faulty construction and suggested further tests be conducted.
In addition, the court ruled that a homeowner may not assert a claim for
breach of a good and workmanlike performance against a subcontractor,
reasoning that an implied warranty will not be imposed unless there is a
demonstrated, compelling need for it. In the subject case, the court con-
cluded Rosenberg's remedy was against Abercombie, which then may
look to JMK for contribution or indemnity as applicable. On another
point, JMK argued that the indemnity clause of the service contract was
inadequate to compel its indemnification of Abercombie for Abercrom-
bie's own negligence. The court agreed, stating that as the service con-
tract was ambiguous as to the indemnification by JMK for Abercombie's
own negligence, and failed the express negligence test.180
Centex Homes v. Buecher,18' involved an action by the homeowners
seeking an injunction against the builder, Centex, from asserting that
homeowners had waived the implied warranty of habitability and good
and workmanlike construction when they purchased their homes. Each
homeowner signed a standard form sales agreement that contained a one
year limited express warranty in lieu of and waiving the implied warran-
ties of habitability and good workmanlike construction. Addressing con-
flicting case law, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that the implied
warranty of good workmanship may be disclaimed by the parties when
their agreement provides for the manner, performance, or quality of the
desired construction. The implied warranty of habitability generally may
not be disclaimed. However, if the defects making the home uninhabit-
able are adequately disclosed, such as when a purchaser buys a problem
house with express and full knowledge of the defects that affect its habit-
ability, then even the implied warranty of habitability can be disclaimed.
In CVN Group, Inc. v. Delgado,1 82 the Texas Supreme Court, after
178. Id. at 325-29.
179. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.565 (Vernon 1987).
180. Rosenburg, 95 S.W.3d at 332.
181. Centex Homes v. Buecher, 95 S.W.3d 266 (Tex. 2002).
182. CVN Group, Inc. v. Delgado, 95 S.W.3d 234 (Tex. 2002).
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much discussion, held that the parties affected by a mechanic's lien can
agree to arbitrate its existence. The homeowners' contract with the con-
tractor provided all disputes between the parties would be subject to arbi-
tration. The arbitrator awarded the contractor damages and found a
valid lien against the homeowners. As required by Texas Property Code
Section 53.154, the contractor applied to the district court to confirm the
award and foreclose its lien. The court overruled the arbitration award
stating the evidence did not support a valid mechanic's and materialman's
lien and that allowing the foreclosure of such liens would be against the
public policy of protecting homesteads. 183 Upon review, the Texas Su-
preme Court ruled that the lower courts exceeded their authority to re-
view an arbitration award. The court went on to say that an award of
arbitrators upon matters submitted to them is given the same effect as the
judgment of a court of last resort. The court concluded that the lower
courts ability to review arbitration decisions on the validity of mechanic's
and materialman's liens would not be allowed unless there was a com-
plete disregard by the arbitrator as to the constitutional and statutory
requirements for perfecting such liens and in the subject case, there was
no indication of such a disregard.1 84
In Page v. Structural Wood Components, Inc.185 and Page v. Marton
Roofing, Inc.,186 Page hired a general contractor, Sepolio, to remodel and
expand a building that Page owned. Sepolio hired several subcontractors,
including Structural Wood and Marton to provide labor and materials.
Before the project was finished, the contract between Page and Sepolio
was terminated, and Page hired six new contractors who finished the pro-
ject without hiring new subcontractors. Because Sepolio failed to pay in
full for the labor and material provided, Structural Wood and Marton
filed affidavits claiming liens on the property more than thirty days after
Page terminated the contract with Sepolio. Structural Wood and Marton
brought actions against Page to enforce its mechanic's and materialman's
liens. The Texas Supreme Court held that a subcontractor that filed its
lien affidavit more than thirty days after the owner terminated the origi-
nal contract with the general contractor, but well before the replacement
contractors finished the project, had failed to satisfy the statutory require-
ment that a lien be filed not later than the thirtieth day after the work is
completed. In Structural Wood, the court concluded the term "work com-
pleted" must be defined in relation to a particular contract and not based
on the overall work of a project for determining compliance with Texas
Property Code Section 53.103.187 In Marton, the Court held that the
fund-trapping provisions of Texas Property Code Sections 53.081 and
53.084 must relate to a particular contract, and Page was not authorized,
and was not liable for failing to withhold funds from the replacement
183. Id. at 235-36.
184. Id. at 239-40.
185. Page v. Structural Wood Components, Inc., 102 S.W.3d 720 (Tex. 2003).
186. Page v. Marton Roofing, Inc., 102 S.W.3d 733 (Tex. 2003).
187. Structural Wood, 102 S.W.3d at 723.
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contractors who had no relationship to Marton. 188
XVII. CONDEMNATION
The case of State v. Warea89 involved a tract of property that was origi-
nally the subject of a highway easement condemnation by the State in
1968. The State did not utilize the entire tract for highway purposes and
it later sought to condemn any remaining fee interest that the property
owner may hold on the property. The court rejected the trial court's use
of the undivided fee rule, and noted that the only issue to be determined
was the value of the property owner's fee interest in the land as encum-
bered by the State's highway right-of-way easement. While the court
noted that the practical effect of the existing highway easement was to
deny the property owner all beneficial use of the property, the case was
remanded for a proper determination of whether and how much the
property owner may be entitled to damages for condemnation of its re-
maining fee interest. 190
In a case examining the sufficiency of expert appraisal testimony, the
Texas Supreme Court found that the subject expert had failed to consider
the before-and-after rule, which requires measuring the difference and
value of the land immediately before and immediately after the taking.
In Exxon Pipeline Co. v. Zwahr,191 the expert appraiser's valuation testi-
mony was premised upon the existence of the condemnation, and there-
fore improperly included the project enhancement in the valuation. The
expert ultimately admitted that the value he placed upon the land did not
exist prior to the condemnation. Because the expert witness did not con-
sider the before and after value of the entire tract, and improperly in-
cluded project enhancement, the court held that the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting the testimony.' 92
In Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Graham,1 93 the property being
condemned was held in a number of undivided interests. Despite naming
all the interests in the condemnation proceeding, the condemning author-
ity was unable to serve two of the property owners and elected to proceed
with the case against only those property owners who had been served.
After a special commissioner's award was issued, the property owners
who had been served claimed that the trial court lacked jurisdiction be-
cause other interest holders had not been served. However, the court
found that the condemning authority's decision to go forward without
service upon some of the owners did not invalidate jurisdiction over those
owners and property interests who had been served and that nothing
under Texas law prevents a condemning authority from proceeding
188. Marton, 102 S.W. 3d at 735.
189. State v. Ware, 86 S.W.3d 817 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.).
190. Id. at 827.
191. Exxon Pipeline Co. v. Zwahr, 88 S.W.3d 623 (Tex. 2002).
192. Id. at 631.




against only a portion of the undivided property interest of a tract be-
cause the judgment would only apply against those property owners who
had been served and their respective interests. The proceedings were not
improper.
In the case of County of Bexar v. Santikos,194 the court reviewed
whether damages resulting from unsafe access and from diminished mar-
ket perception were compensable. The court held that a trier of fact is
allowed to consider unsafe access when determining compensation. Fur-
ther, in a matter of first impression, the court held that a jury instruction
regarding the impact of diminished market perception upon the fair mar-
ket value of the subject property was not improper.
In the condemnation matter of Dahl v. State,1 9 5 the court reviewed the
question of whether the holder of a purchase money mortgage note has a
valid inverse condemnation claim for the balance remaining on the note
in excess of the condemnation award. The court noted that if mortgage
holders were allowed to seek recovery of the full amount of outstanding
debts in the event that a condemnation award was less than that debt, the
state would become the insurer of all purchase money mortgages. Find-
ing that no state or federal law warranted such a proposition, the court
held that the mortgage holder did not assert a valid claim for inverse
condemnation and the state was entitled to a sovereign immunity
defense.
In a case revolving around both freedom of speech and regulatory tak-
ing, the court in Eller Media Co. v. City of Houston,196 ultimately held
that a billboard ordinance prohibiting the construction of new billboards
was not a compensable regulatory taking and was a valid exercise of po-
lice power. The court noted that regulations that diminished property
values do not necessarily rise to the level of a taking, and that the amorti-
zation period provided for in the subject ordinance protected the invest-
ment of the property owner because the regulations allowed sufficient
time for the property owner to recoup his investment.
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals reviewed two flooding-related in-
verse condemnation cases with distinct results. In Berry v. City of
Reno, 197 the court held that no viable cause of action existed against the
city because the landowner failed to prove the "public use" of the alleged
taking. The court found that the summary judgment evidence of the
property owner merely showed that they did not know why the city had
constructed the drainage system, and therefore evidence that the city con-
structed the system for a public use was not presented in the summary
judgment proceeding. The trial court's grant of summary judgment for
194. County of Bexar v. Santikos, 107 S.W.3d 677 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, pet.
granted).
195. Dahl v. State, 92 S.W.3d 856 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
196. Media Co. v. City of Houston, 101 S.W.3d 668 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2003, pet. denied).
197. Berry v. City of Reno, 107 S.W.3d 128 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
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the city was affirmed. In the case of City of Keller v. Wilson,198 the court
overruled the city's contention that its drainage system was not provided
for public use by pointing to the city's master drainage plan as an indica-
tion that drainage across the subject property benefited the community as
a whole. Further, the court found that the city had intentionally taken
the subject land since it knew that water flowing from new developments
that it had approved would necessarily flow across the land. This knowl-
edge along with the decision to construct a drainage channel on adjoining
property evidenced an intentional taking of the subject property. In the
Keller case, the court upheld the inverse condemnation award.
The Beaumont Court of Appeals also reviewed a flooding claim in Sab-
ine River Authority of Texas v. Hughes,199 determining that a River Au-
thority's intentional act of releasing water from a reservoir did not result
in a taking. In reversing the summary judgment in favor of the landown-
ers, the court found that evidence existed that the released water mixed
with water from other sources before causing the flooding. The court
held this evidence was sufficient to negate the taking element of the prop-
erty owner's inverse condemnation claim.
XVIII. AD VALOREM TAXATION
In the matter of Appraisal Review Board of El Paso v. Fisher,200 it was
stipulated that the property owner had received no notice of the increase
in the appraised tax value of his property from 1985 to 1992, even though
he had recorded a deed to the property in 1984. The court noted that the
law unambiguously prohibits taxing authorities from increasing an ap-
praised value without due process. Because the taxing entities failed to
provide the required notice to the property owner for a number of years,
any taxes and penalties assessed during that period were void. The court
also noted that the voluntary payment rule does not apply against a tax-
payer when the underlying tax is considered void due to a violation of
due process.
The Houston Court of Appeals also rendered a decision regarding the
remedies of property owners who failed to receive notices of increased
valuations. In Houston Land & Cattle Co. v. Harris County Appraisal
District,201 the property owner had purchased property with knowledge
that taxes were delinquent for a number of years. The property owner
challenged the validity of these taxes on the grounds that the taxing au-
thorities had failed to deliver notices of increases to the appraised value
to the previous owner. Relying upon the language that appears in Texas
Tax Code Section 41.11(c), the court held that the statute restricted nulli-
198. City of Keller v. Wilson, 86 S.W.3d 693 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. filed).
199. Sabine River Auth. of Tex. v. Hughes, 92 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002,
pet. filed).
200. Appraisal Review Bd. of El Paso v. Fisher, 88 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. App.-El Paso
2002, pet. denied).
201. Houston Land & Cattle Co. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 104 S.W.3d 622
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
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fication of increases in appraised value to owners at the time of the in-
creases, and not subsequent owners. Based upon this strict interpretation
of the Texas Tax Code, the current property owner did not have the right
to challenge the previous owner's failure to receive notice and the delin-
quent taxes were valid.
In yet another case critiquing the sufficiency of a taxing authority's pro-
cedures, a property owner challenged his obligation to pay taxes when his
property was not properly described by the taxing authorities on the tax
rolls. In Spring Branch Independent School District v. Siebert,202 the
property owner had divided a tract of land into three separate lots with
identification of those lots appearing on the recorded plat. However, be-
cause the certified tax appraisal roll did not identify two of the three lots
with the reasonable certainty required by Texas Tax Code Sec-
tion 25.03(a), the court held that the property owner was not required to
pay taxes on the misidentified properties.
In St. Joseph Orthodox Christian Church v. Spring Branch Independent
School District,20 3 the court confirmed the proposition that alleged enti-
tlement to an exemption may not be raised for the first time as a counter-
claim in a delinquent tax collection lawsuit. A taxpayer seeking
entitlement to an exemption must timely apply for and challenge an ap-
praisal district's failure to grant that exemption under the Texas Tax
Code.
XIX. ENTITIES
In Landrum v. Thunderbird Speedway, Inc. ,204 the relatives of a by-
stander killed in the raceway pits by a flying tire sued the corporate lessor
of the raceway for negligence in the accident. The company was granted
summary judgment on the ground that it had forfeited its corporate status
sixteen months before the accident and, thus, could not be held liable.
The Dallas Court of Appeals agreed, noting that under the express terms
of Article 7.12, Section F(1) of the Texas Business Corporations Act, the
1995 forfeiture of Thunderbird's charter also resulted in dissolution under
the law then in effect. Under the TBCA a dissolved corporation's corpo-
rate existence continues for three years after dissolution only for limited
purposes, including permitting the survival of any existing claims against
the corporation, but not for the purposes of allowing any future claims to
accrue. The accident here in question occurred after the corporate disso-
lution, and therefore the company was not liable.
In Pinnacle Data Services, Inc. v. Gillen,20 5 Pinnacle, which owned a
202. Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Siebert, 100 S.W.3d 520 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
203. St. Joseph Orthodox Christian Church v. Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 110
S.W.3d 477 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
204. Landrum v. Thunderbird Speedway, Inc., 97 S.W.3d 756 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003,
no pet.).
205. Pinnacle Data Servs., Inc. v. Gillen, 104 S.W.3d 188 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003,
no pet.).
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fifty percent ownership interest in a limited liability company brought suit
against certain members of the company, alleging that the defendant
members had breached the company's regulations in voting to change the
management of the company from the members to managers. The com-
pany regulations allowed the management of the company to be changed
from member-managed to manager-managed (by amendment of the Ar-
ticles of Organization) by a vote of two-thirds of the ownership interest,
whereas the Articles allowed for this change by a vote of two-thirds of the
members. The court held that both under the Texas Limited Liability
Company Act and by the express terms of the regulations themselves, the
regulations were subject to the Articles, and that in the event of any con-
flict between the two, the Articles should govern. Thus, the plaintiffs
claims based on the regulations failed.
XX. INDEMNITIES
In Hernandez v. Big 4, Inc.,206 an indemnification agreement was unen-
forceable under Texas law because it failed to meet the requirements of
the express negligence doctrine. The contract provision required the sub-
contractor to defend and indemnify the contractor against all claims,
causes of action, lawsuits and liability for injury or property damage due
to the subcontractor's work. Although the subcontractor's duty to in-
demnify was limited to damage caused by the subcontractor's negligence,
its duty to defend extended to damage caused by the contractor's negli-
gence. For any indemnity agreement to be enforced against the indemni-
tor with respect to the indemnified party's own negligence, the agreement
must comply with the express negligence doctrine and the conspicuous-
ness requirement in order to provide the indemnitor with "fair notice" as
to such obligations. The court found that the express negligence doctrine
was not satisfied because of ambiguity in determining who was an "in-
demnified party." The court based its finding of ambiguity on the fact
that in no place was "indemnified party" capitalized and treated as a de-
fined term.
In American Indemnity Lloyds v. Travelers Property & Casualty Insur-
ance Co.. 20 7 AIL, the subcontractor's (Elite) insurer, sued TPC, the con-
tractor's insurer, for payment of a portion of the defense costs and
settlement paid to Elite's injured employee in his lawsuit against both the
contractor (Caddell) and Elite. Elite's primary commercial general liabil-
ity insurer was AIL, with Caddell listed as an additional insured as re-
quired by the subcontract between Elite and Caddell. Caddell's primary
commercial general liability insurer was TPC, and Elite was not named as
an insured under that policy. AlL contended that the virtually identical
"other insurance" provisions in both the AIL and TPC policies requires
that TPC pay a portion of its costs in this case due to the fact that TPC
206. Hernandez v. Big 4, Inc., 241 F. Supp. 2d 715 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
207. Am. Indem. Lloyds v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 335 F.3d 429 (5th Cir. 2003).
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and AIL were providing concurrent primary coverage to Caddell. Argu-
ing that it should not have to pay AIL for any portion of AIL's costs,
TPC relied upon the indemnity agreement between Elite and Caddell,
which required that Elite indemnify Caddell in all cases, unless there was
a judicial determination that the injury in question resulted from Cad-
dell's sole fault or negligence. Finding no Texas case directly on point,
the court reasoned that a valid indemnity agreement, as found in this
case, would be made ineffectual if the indemnitor's insurance company
was allowed to recover against the indemnitee's insurance company sim-
ply because the indemnitee also carried general liability insurance. Such
a holding would lead to circuitous litigation because the indemnitee's in-
surance company, subrogated to the rights of its insured, could then sue
the indemnitor, the insured party under the policy already paid on, for
reimbursement under the indemnity agreement. The court held that a
valid indemnity agreement will control over the "other insurance" provi-
sions of the respective parties' insurance policies, absent some indication
to the contrary.
In Banner Sign & Barricade, Inc. v. Price Construction, Inc.,20 8 the con-
tractor, Price, sought a declaratory judgment against Banner, the subcon-
tractor, that the contractual indemnity in the subcontract was valid and
enforceable, requiring Banner to contribute in an action against Price and
Banner. The indemnity provision at issue sought to indemnify Price, even
from the consequences of its own negligence. The court held that the
language of this particular indemnity provision did satisfy the express
negligence doctrine's requirement that it be specifically and conspicu-
ously stated within the four corners of the document, noting that the
phrase "regardless of the cause or of the sole, joint, comparative or con-
current negligence or gross negligence of [Price], its officers, agents or
employees" 20 9 specifically asserts that it covers the negligence of the in-
demnified party. Thus, despite the fact that Banner was found not negli-




In Union Pacific Resources Co. v. Cooper,210 the owners executed an
oil, gas and mineral lease to the predecessor in interest of Union Pacific.
The owners brought suit against Union Pacific for damages based on nui-
sance and the trial court awarded $85,000 because the owners were
forced to leave their home for over a month during the drilling of a well
based on fear and apprehension that the escape of poisonous gas would
208. Banner Sign & Barricade, Inc. v. Price Constr., Inc., 94 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 2002, pet. denied).
209. Id. at 697.




kill them.21 1 Union Pacific agreed to reimburse the owners for their ex-
penses in connection with their relocation, but the owners refused pay-
ment and brought suit instead. Although a nuisance can occur by
emotional harm to a person from the deprivation of the enjoyment of his
or her property, such as fear, apprehension, offense or loss of peace of
mind, because there was only a fear and apprehension of what might oc-
cur, and no sour gas was released from the well in question, and no physi-
cal injury occurred, the court stated that fear of the unknown is not a
nuisance. The court gave weight to the argument that Texas is an indus-
try (specifically energy-related) driven state and allowing a cause of ac-
tion to persons who have not been harmed but might be afraid that they
one day will be harmed would open the courts to needless litigation.
In Bates v. Schneider National Carriers, Inc.,212 the court was faced with
the issue of whether damages resulting from a chemical plant constituted
a permanent or temporary nuisance. The court cited numerous cases for
the proposition that permanent injuries give rise to a cause of action for
permanent damages (the amount of which is discussed infra in the case of
H.E. Stevenson v. E.I. DuPont) and temporary injuries give rise to tempo-
rary damages, which are the amount of damages that accrue during the
continuance of the injury covered by the period for which the action is
brought. The characterization of an injury as either permanent or tempo-
rary must be determined by its duration. A permanent injury must be
constant and continuous, rather than occasional or intermittent. Tempo-
rary injuries however are the subject of some sporadic activity that may
be contingent upon an irregular force. Another indication of a temporary
injury is the ability of a court to enjoin the injury causing activity - an
injury that can be terminated by its very nature cannot be considered
permanent. Based on the foregoing descriptions of the nature of an in-
jury and the facts presented in the case, the appeals court remanded to
the trial court for determination of whether the nuisance was permanent
or temporary.
B. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
In Lewis v. Nolan,213 a client brought a malpractice claim against his
attorney for failure to respond to a summary judgment motion in a case
in which judgment was entered against the client six years earlier. The
client discovered the judgment only when, in connection with the sale of
some land, an abstract of judgment was revealed. The defendant con-
tended that the claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations
211. In the drilling industry, it is apparently common knowledge that hydrogen sulfide
gas ("sour gas") may be encountered when drilling at depths between fifteen and seven-
teen thousand feet - this gas is poisonous and can cause death to those who come in con-
tact with it.
212. Bates v. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc., 95 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2002, pet. granted).




because the abstract of judgment, filed in 1995, gave constructive notice
of the judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defen-
dant. On appeal, the court held that the mere recording of abstracts is
insufficient to establish as a matter of law that the client discovered or
should have discovered the facts establishing his claim and therefore re-
versed and remanded the case.
In the case of In re Skiles,214 the court addressed the issue of attorney
disqualification under the joint defense privilege. The plaintiff bought a
house from defendant and thereafter brought an action alleging viola-
tions of the DTPA. Defendant initiated a coverage suit against Farmers
Insurance Exchange, which was defended by a law firm. After settling
the coverage suit, the plaintiff's attorney joined such law firm. In grant-
ing the defendant's motion to disqualify plaintiff's attorney, the court
held that the joint defense privilege protecting confidential communica-
tions made for the purpose of facilitating the rendering of legal services
does not just apply to codefendants, but can be applied to prevent the
disclosure of confidential communications made by the client's lawyer to
a lawyer representing another party in a pending action or a matter of
common interest. Because the defendant's attorney discussed the DTPA
claim with Farmers' law firm, which subsequently included plaintiff's at-
torney, the court held that the plaintiff's attorney should be disqualified.
C. MINERALS
The court in Exxon Corp. v. Pluff,215 held that a landowner had no
standing to bring a cause of action against Exxon for failure to remove oil
field equipment that had been placed there many years previously when
the property was owned by a previous owner, because there was no evi-
dence that the party who owned the property at the time of the injury had
assigned its rights in the action to the plaintiff. Injury to land is a per-
sonal right that accrues at the time of the injury. Plaintiff failed to sup-
port his contention that the language in the deed that conveyed "all and
singular the rights and appurtenances thereto in anywise belonging" was
sufficient to assign the cause of action, and there was also no evidence
that the injury occurred during the time that plaintiff's grantor owned the
property.216 Furthermore, the court determined that Exxon's right to re-
move the equipment at the expiration of the lease did not impose a duty
to remove the equipment.
D. TRESPASS
In H.E. Stevenson v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.,217 a chemical
plant owned by DuPont emitted metal particulates that contaminated the
plaintiffs' property. In a case of first impression in Texas, the Fifth Circuit
214. In re Skiles, 102 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. App-Beaumont 2003, no pet.).
215. Exxon Corp. v. Pluff, 94 S.W.3d 22 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2002, pet. denied).
216. Id. at 28.
217. H.E. Stevenson v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 327 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2003).
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addressed the question of whether an airborne contaminant may be con-
sidered a trespass. The court cited established Texas precedent that "[t]o
constitute trespass there must be some physical entry upon the land by
some 'thing." 2 18 Because the only showing necessary is entry over land
by some "thing," the Court concluded Texas law does permit recovery for
airborne particulates. If a permanent trespass occurred, the plaintiffs
could recover the difference in the market value of the land immediately
before and immediately after the trespass. However, recovery for tempo-
rary trespass is limited to the amount necessary to place the owner of the
property in the same position he occupied prior to the injury. The court
held that "in absence of proof that repair is actually or economically fea-
sible, the injury may be deemed permanent" and damages may be
awarded on such basis. 2 19 Because, however, the measure of damages in
the context of a permanent trespass is based on the difference of the mar-
ket value of the land immediately prior to and immediately after the tres-
pass occurred, it follows that two different valuations must be present in
order to calculate damages. Because the plaintiff only presented one val-
uation of the property, the court remanded to the trial court for a deter-
mination of damages only.
In Russell v. American Real Estate Corp.,220 the tenant at sufferance
sued the foreclosure purchaser's property manager for trespass. The ten-
ant, Russell, was informed of an April 6, 1999 foreclosure sale of the
house. Prior to the sale, Russell found a new place to live, moved most of
his possessions to the new residence and turned off the electricity at the
old residence. Russell was out of town during the week of the foreclosure
sale but intended to return and finish moving his property. Immediately
after the foreclosure sale, the purchaser instructed its property manager
(AREC) to visit the house; if the house was vacant, AREC was to re-key
it. But, if the house was occupied, AREC was to place a notice on the
door and call the owner for further instructions. Upon visiting the house,
and without entering it, AREC noticed that the garbage can was over-
flowing, several newspapers were on the ground, and the mailbox was full
of junk mail; AREC also verified that the electricity was disconnected.
AREC later entered the house, took an inventory of the remaining items,
and removed them to off-site storage. Russell returned to the old house a
few days later and discovered that his property was missing and sued for
trespass. On appeal from summary judgment in favor of Russell, the
court noted that trespass only requires proof of interference with the
right of possession, even if no damage is done. AREC argued that Rus-
sell's lease was terminated and, therefore, Russell had no right of posses-
sion. Although the foreclosure sale terminated the existing lease, Russell
automatically became a tenant at sufferance. Texas Property Code Sec-
218. Id. at 406 (quoting Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 567 (Tex.
1962)).
219. Id. at 408.




tion 24.005(b) requires the purchaser at a foreclosure sale to give a resi-
dential tenant at sufferance, not otherwise in default under its lease, 30
days notice to vacate before filing a forcible entry and detainer suit. Rus-
sell could not be removed until the eviction process was complete.
In Amerman v. Martin,22 1 a garden variety boundary dispute between
adjoining landowners, the court set forth the matters a plaintiff must
prove in a trespass to try title action: the plaintiff must prove (1) a regular
chain of conveyances from the sovereignty, (2) superior title out of a
common source, (3) title by limitations, or (4) prior possession which has
not been abandoned. The court also pointed out that although boundary
disputes may be tried by a statutory action of trespass to try title, such
suits are not pure trespass to try title actions but are in fact merely
boundary disputes that may involve questions of title and that it is not
necessary for the plaintiff to establish superior title in the manner re-
quired by a formal trespass to try title action; a recorded deed showing
plaintiff's interest in the disputed property is sometimes sufficient to es-
tablish a present legal right of possession in such suits. The outcome of
the dispute was decided on the basis of conflicting surveys, with the court
stating that the law and principle of surveys establish a priority of calls, in
which priority is granted first to calls for natural objects, then to calls for
artificial objects, then to calls for course and distance, and finally to calls
for quantity or acreage.
E. Lis PENDENS
In Silver Chevrolet Pickup VIN 1GCECI4T7YE257128 Tag No. 3TM16
v. State,222 a plaintiff whose real property was seized by the state after a
marijuana crop was discovered on his property challenged the forfeiture
of his property on the basis that the state had not filed a lis pendens
within three days following initiation of the forfeiture proceeding as re-
quired by criminal statute. The court agreed, relying on the clear lan-
guage of the statute and the principle that forfeiture should be strictly
construed. It also noted that, contrary to the state's contention that a lis
pendens is merely to put third parties on notice of a claim and thus failure
to file the lis pendens did not harm the plaintiff, the intent of a lis
pendens is to protect prospective purchasers and creditors by giving them
notice of the claim.
F. ANNEXATION
In City of Burleson v. Bartula,223 the court addressed the permitted
measure of the term "inhabitants" as used in connection with a home-rule
municipality's annexation rights and a municipality's right to determine
the number of its inhabitants. The City of Burleson had sought to annex
221. Amerman v. Martin, 83 S.W.3d 858 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. granted).
222. Silver Chevrolet Pickup VIN 1GCEC14T7YE257128 Tag No. 3TM16 v. State, 99
S.W.3d 874 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2003, pet. filed).
223. City of Burleson v. Bartula, 110 S.W.3d 561 (Tex. App.-Waco 2003, no pet.).
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property owned by forty-six individuals and one business, and those prop-
erty owners filed for a temporary injunction, alleging, among other
things, that the annexation was illegal because it included some property
outside the extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) of the city. Under Sec-
tion 42.021 of the Texas Local Government Code, the ETJ of a munici-
pality with 5,000 to 24,999 inhabitants is one mile, while the ETJ of a
municipality with 25,000 to 49,999 inhabitants is two miles. The property
owners argued that the federal census report showed that the population
of Burleson was less than 25,000 (and thus the city's ETJ was only one
mile). Burleson maintained that it could rely on a resolution it had
passed that its population was 25,575. The court held that the city had the
authority to determine its population notwithstanding the federal census
so long as it was made in good faith with no proof of fraud.
City of Balch Springs v. Lucas,2 2 4 dealt with issues of standing in bring-
ing actions challenging annexation. Property owners filed a petition and
application for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the city's
proposed annexation was unlawful because it did not comply with a new
statute that requires municipalities to prepare an annexation plan identi-
fying anticipated annexations and to wait three years before annexing
those identified properties. The city challenged the property owners'
standing to bring the suit. The trial court granted the injunction and pro-
hibited the city from voting on the annexation. On appeal, the court dis-
cussed the distinction between challenges to a municipality's authority to
annex certain property (in which private actions are permitted) and mere
violations of statutory procedure (which may be brought only by the state
through a quo warranto proceeding.) The court dissolved the temporary
injunction issued by the trial court, ruling that the city's lack of compli-
ance was merely procedural and further ruling that, since no private
cause of action can be brought to attack an annexation unless it is "void"
(and since there was never a vote on the ordinance it could not be "void,"
only "voidable"), an action challenging the annexation could be brought
only through a quo warranto proceeding.
G. PREMISES LIABILITY
In Dow Chemical Co. v. Bright,225 an employee of the general contrac-
tor was injured. The issue was whether the owner owed the employee a
duty as being governed by the law concerning a general contractor's duty
to a subcontractor. The court stated that two types of premises defect
cases exist in that context: (1) defects that existed on the premises when
the independent contractor entered, and (2) defects created by the inde-
pendent contractor. The employee argued that the owner was liable
under the second category of cases. The court stated that, in this cate-
gory, although in general a premises owner does not owe a duty to an
independent contractor, liability may attach if the owner retains some
224. City of Balch Springs v. Lucas, 101 S.W.3d 116 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, no pet.).
225. Dow Chem. Co. v. Bright, 89 S.W.3d 602 (Tex. 2002).
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control over a contractor's work yet fails to exercise reasonable care to
ensure the contractor's safety. In this instance, the employer's role must
be something more than a "general right to order the work to start or
stop, to inspect the progress or receive reports. '226 The court set forth
two ways through which a plaintiff can prove that a right to control ex-
isted: (1) evidence of a contractual agreement that explicitly grants con-
trol to the owner, and (2) evidence that the owner actually exercised
control over the manner in which the subcontractor performed its work.
In addition, any control evidenced by the owner must relate to the injury
caused by the negligence. Although the owner's safety inspector in-
spected the work site prior to allowing the subcontractor to work in the
area and had a safety inspector on site, the court held that this was not
enough to establish the owner's actual control of the subcontractor be-
cause it is not evidence that the subcontractor was not free to do his work
in the manner he desired. Furthermore, the court stated that the con-
struction contract between the general contractor and the owner indi-
cated that the contractor knew it was responsible for the safety of its
employees, and that the presence of the owner's safety inspector did not
cause either the subcontractor or the general contractor to lower its
safety consciousness.
In Batra v. Clark,227 the court addressed what it called an issue of first
impression when it held that an absentee residential landlord did not owe
a duty of ordinary care to a neighbor girl who was attacked by the ten-
ant's pit bulldog because the landlord did not have actual knowledge of
the dog's "vicious propensities." In violation of the lease agreement, the
tenant kept a pit bull at the premises which was usually chained behind a
fence at the side of the house. The victim of the attack was standing by
the fence attempting to distract the animal so that the tenant's daughter
could exit the house. The animal broke through the fence and bit the
victim several times. In a suit filed by the victim's next friend against
both the landlord and tenant alleging negligence, the trial court found the
landlord and tenant each fifty percent liable. On appeal, the landlord
argued that since he was an out-of-possession landlord who did not retain
control of the premises, he owed no duty of reasonable care to prevent
the dog's attack. The victim argued that (1) the landlord did possess ac-
tual knowledge that the dog was on the premises and imputed knowledge
of the dog's dangerous propensities, (2) the lease retained for the land-
lord the ability to control the property because the lease allowed him
access at any time, and (3) the landlord had retained the ability to control
the dog because of the provisions in the lease prohibiting pets without
landlord's consent and granting landlord the right to remove any unau-
thorized pets. The court held that an out-of-possession landlord owes a
duty of ordinary care to third parties if the landlord has actual knowl-
edge, not imputed knowledge, of an animal's presence on the leased
226. Id. at 606.
227. Batra v. Clark, 110 S.W.3d 126 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst. Dist] 2003, no pet.).
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premises and its dangerous propensities. Because the facts of the case
showed only that the landlord had imputed knowledge of the dog's vi-
cious propensities, the court ruled that the landlord did not owe the vic-
tim a duty of ordinary care.
Two slip and fall cases, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Diaz,2 28 and Brookshire
Food Stores, L.L.C. v. Allen, 2 2 9 followed the Texas Supreme Court's re-
cent ruling in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reese.2 30 In Reese, the Texas Su-
preme Court held that close proximity of a premises owner's employee to
a dangerous condition, without more, is legally insufficient to charge the
premises owner with constructive notice, and that some proof must exist
of how long the hazard was present before the owner can be held liable
for failing to discover and warn of the dangerous condition. In Diaz, the
Fort Worth Court of Appeals overruled its decision in Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Rangel,23 1 which held that a store's policy of allowing customers to
bring drinks into the store was sufficient by itself to establish negligence.
In Diaz and Allen, the respective courts of appeals each found for the
premises owner, requiring the plaintiffs to prove the length of time that a
hazard had been present before constructive knowledge can be imputed
to the premises owner.
In Brookshire Grocery Co. v. Taylor,232 the plaintiff filed a premises
liability claim after she slipped and fell on a melted ice cube which had
fallen from a soda dispenser in the deli section of a grocery store. The
plaintiff contended that the dispenser itself was the "dangerous condi-
tion," whereas the defendant argued that the puddle, not the dispenser,
was the danger. The court agreed with the plaintiff, finding that the dan-
gerous condition was the dispenser itself, noting that evidence indicated
that ice fell onto the floor on a daily basis, and that the defendant's em-
ployees admitted during testimony that the ice caused a hazard.
In Houston v. Northwest Village, Ltd.,233 the plaintiff, a newspaper de-
livery person, slipped and fell on ice on a sidewalk of an apartment com-
plex at which she was delivering newspapers to residents. She filed suit
against the owners of the complex and the complex management alleging
that the ice on the sidewalks was a premises defect for which the defen-
dant was liable. At trial, the apartment complex manager stated that she
had not yet been outside of her apartment at the time of the plaintiff's
fall, and therefore was not aware of the condition of the sidewalks. On
appeal, the court defined the sole issue as whether the plaintiff was on the
228. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Diaz, 109 S.W.3d 584 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no
pet.).
229. Brookshire Food Stores, L.L.C. v. Allen, 93 S.W.3d 897 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
2002, no pet.).
230. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reese, 81 S.W.3d 812 (Tex. 2002).
231. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rangel, 966 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet.
denied).
232. Brookshire Grocery Co. v. Taylor, 102 S.W.3d 816, (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003,
pet. filed).




premises as a licensee or invitee. The defendants argued that the plaintiff
was only a licensee because she did not have any business relationship
with the defendants from which invitee status could be implied. The
court responded that the defendants' relationship with the plaintiff was
not determined solely by the nature of her relationship with the defend-
ants. Rather, the plaintiff had a business relationship with the tenants,
pursuant to which the plaintiff agreed to deliver newspapers to certain
apartments in return for payment, and this business relationship was suf-
ficient to imply that the plaintiff was invited by the tenants for that pur-
pose. Because the plaintiff had entered the property as an invitee, even if
not an invitee of the defendants, rather than as a licensee, the fact that
the defendants did not yet have actual knowledge of the dangerous condi-
tion present in the form of icy sidewalks was not sufficient to defeat the
duty owed by the defendants to that invitee.
H. ZONING
City of San Antonio v. Arden Encino Partners, Ltd.,234 addressed a
plaintiff's claim that the city's "downzoning" of the plaintiff's property
constituted impermissible "spot-zoning" (that its property had been sin-
gled out for different treatment for no justifiable reason). Encino had
purchased its property in 1994, when it was zoned B-2, which permits
multi-family apartment complexes. Five years later an adjacent tract was
rezoned from single-family residential to B-2, which prompted action by
nearby homeowners. Downzoning was subsequently effected. Encino ar-
gued that there were no legitimate public concerns for the change in zon-
ing and that it was effected merely to placate a few disgruntled
homeowners and was therefore spot-zoning. The court found that there
was sufficient evidence in the record that there had been changes in con-
ditions due to growth and that plaintiff had not met its admittedly heavy
burden to show no valid relationship between the rezoning and public
welfare.
I. ORDINANCES
In Jamestown Partners, L.P. v. City of Fort Worth,235 the court deter-
mined that when a municipality and a property owner entered into an
agreement which provided that the municipality would proceed with a
building standards commission ("BSC") review of the property unless the
owner satisfied the requirements of the agreement, the municipality's ob-
ligation to forgo the BSC review did not preclude it from pursuing other
remedies against the property owner for alleged breaches of city ordi-
nances. Fort Worth ordinances provided for various options for the city
to address violations of code provisions, and the court held that because
234. City of San Antonio v. Arden Encino Partners, Ltd., 103 S.W.3d 627 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 2003, no pet.).
235. Jamestown Partners, L.P. v. City of Fort Worth, 83 S.W.3d 376 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2002, pet. denied).
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the legislature made a clear distinction between civil actions to enforce
ordinances and quasi-judicial enforcement through a BSC (since they are
located in distinct subchapters of Chapter 54 of the Texas Local Govern-
ment Code), the city could proceed with a civil action to enforce city
ordinances.
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